Recently I have published (Kindle Direct Publishing) two books: informal approach to philosophy and other issues which you might find interesting. They are

“Philosophy in the light and in the shadows: Commentary on Philosophy, Metaphysics, Religion, Free Will and Disembodied Existence “

https://www.amazon.com/dp/B09LZ2MQY2

“A Trek Through the Foothills of Philosophy: Questions, Reflections, and Conversations – Visiting a Few Philosophical Issues .”

https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0CM8DV2DN

Amazon states regarding the first: This book is a somewhat irreverent look at philosophy, asking what is the value of philosophy? Following that introduction are commentary on issues in metaphysics, religion, the free will issue and the claims of disembodied existence both prior to birth and following death. The author uses a critical, linguistic approach in dealing with these issue. The book should be provocative reading for students of philosophy and anyone with some interest in the subject.

And regarding the second: You might ask, “Why another book on philosophy? Aren’t there already too many?” Yes, a skeptic might say, too many already. But insofar as the study of philosophy is more than an academic project and constitutes important aspects of a person’s life, a book can bring out the personal (and maybe unique) experience of philosophy. This is what the present volume attempts to do. In so doing, it seeks to shine some light on the field of philosophy.

The study of philosophy can be compared to a hike in the hills insofar as it requires some dedication and can bring benefit, both intellectual and spiritual. We follow Tavio and his friend Meño as they try to establish a few footholds on a few gentle rock climbs in the geography of philosophy. In so doing they discuss issues and questions regarding the nature of philosophy, ethics, justice, religion, reality, belief, knowledge, and free will. This takes place in context of Tavio recounting some of his philosophical growth and his appreciation of the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Ludwig Wittgenstein. In closing, they try their hand at stating the value of the study and a life of philosophy.

When we first come to Nietzsche’s writings we’re likely to see him as an ally of secular thinking.  He  rejects divinity, traditional religion, and the metaphysical philosophies allied with religious theism.  And, in his early work,  HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN, he praises what we could call the scientific method that enables humans to get at some truth regarding the natural and human world.  In short, there’s plenty in Nietzsche’s work that conforms to secular thinking on issues like the validity of religious truth (see section “The Religious Life” in HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN)  and the nature of human existence.  After all, Nietzsche is famous for announcing the “death of God,” and his very blunt rejection of Christianity and religious-based morality in his book, The Antichrist.

However, when we look a little deeper into Nietzsche’s works, starting with Human, All Too Human,  we  might question  his status as a precursor of secular humanism in the true sense of that phrase, “precursor of secular humanism.”  Why would I say that?  And why would a  Nietzsche scholar like Richard Schacht state the following regarding the spirit of the investigation that Nietzsche expresses in HUMAN, ALL TOO HUMAN?   “…the passion that drives it is not only that of an honesty that will tolerate no nonsense or groundless wishful thinking, but also of a desperate search for enough to work with and ways of doing so to sustain ourselves despite all.  To call this ‘secular humanism’ would be to sell it short; for while Nietzsche’s outlook is radically secular, he is far from taking humanity,  either in general or as embodied in each and every one of us, to be the locus of meaning and value.”

Before we try to say what Schacht may have meant, let’s consider the “humanism”  at issue here (modern humanism)  and compare it to some the 19^th Century atheistic and agnosticism that was being expressed in Nietzsche’s time.

Consider first a few definitions of modern secular humanism:

Humanism is a progressive life stance that, without supernaturalism, affirms our ability and responsibility to lead meaningful, ethical lives capable of adding to the greater good of humanity. • American Humanist Association

 Humanism is an approach to life based on reason and our common humanity, recognizing that moral values are properly founded on human nature and experience alone. • The Bristol Humanist Group

Humanism is a democratic and ethical life stance, which affirms that human beings have the right and responsibility to give meaning and shape to their own lives. It stands for the building of a more humane society through an ethic based on human and other natural values in the spirit of reason and free inquiry through human capabilities. It is not theistic, and it does not accept supernatural views of reality   –  The International Humanist and Ethical Union

Other definitions and statements of principles emphasize the commitment to democracy,  to justice and fairness in society.  In short, modern secular humanists have  a commitment to humanitarianism and democratic institutions as their best hope for achieving some degree of justice and happiness.

Probably one word sums up much of the contemporary humanist outlook:  Progress.  Secular humanists tend to believe in progress.  With our move away from irrational religious dogma and theism and as people abandoned much of pre-scientific thinking of the past, we have realized and will continue to realize progress in most phases of life.  With the Enlightenment, the increase in rationality, and the rise of the natural sciences, we have progressed toward a vastly improved world.  The attitude generally is one of optimism, as expressed by Steven Pinker in his latest book, Enlightenment Now – The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism and Progress.  In short, humanists tend to emphasize our capacity for human progress based on rational behavior, rationally grounded ethics, and commitment to science as a basis for our view of the world.

Although some of Nietzsche’s writings tends in this direction,  significant parts of his writing diverts from this type of humanism.  First, he gives voice to an attitude expressed by other “philosophical” thinkers prior to and leading up to the 19^th Century (Pascal, Dostoevsky) who lamented the loss of belief in God.  Contrary to a celebratory attitude accompanying the abandonment of belief in a God,  some of the 19^th Century secularists (in the West) were just breaking with a whole culture of religious ‘truth’ and values and found the prospects to be daunting, even frightening.   The end of theistically based thinking and acting were not causes for celebrating.   And Nietzsche’s announcement of the death of God, in the book, The Gay Science,  (Bk 3, 125)   is not a celebration but a warning that without belief in God humans were setting out in uncharted waters, so to speak.  The early Nietzsche at times is ambivalent about the “death of God,” which was his reference to the end of an entire culture of values and version of ‘truth.’

Secondly, as a result of his inquiry into human thinking on philosophy, morality, and religion and his investigations of actual behavior in human society and governments (state), Nietzsche’s picture of the human condition is one very far from an optimistic one. He is most skeptical of humanistic claims that when freed of religious constraints and pre-scientific beliefs humans will rely on reason and commit to ethical ideals.

So what can we say about Nietzsche’s early work, Human, All Too Human, and Schacht’s remark that it does not represents Nietzsche as a secular humanist at all? We can draw few preliminary conclusions, among them the following:
In this book Nietzsche develops a strict, naturalism that rejects idea of human as rationally driven. He does a psychological analysis of man’s values and beliefs and as a result rejects claims to rational ethics, democracy, and a rationally based philosophy.  Even the title of the book, Human, all too human implies limitations of human action and motives. What do we imply when we say of someone, he is human all too human? Often the phrase implies that someone has failed to perform up to ethical ideals and maybe even acted dishonorably.   In short, it is a way of saying that we should not expect consistently rational, ethically good behavior from human beings. Intellectual excellence and ethical virtue are not often part of our nature as evolved human animals. Nietzsche was markedly aware of our evolution as biological beings and aware of the psychological (often irrational) limitations of our actual values and beliefs to accept the view that humans are rational, ethical beings.

According to Nietzsche, the values and beliefs that drive human thinking and belief have a variety of sources. We learn these by a close study of human psychology, human interaction with other humans, culture, and the actual valuations that drive human behavior. But Schacht sees all this as a denial that “humanity … is the locus of meaning and value.” It is not exactly clear what this means. Surely Schacht does not imply that for Nietzsche meaning and values are derived from a source external to human existence. Maybe all he means is that Nietzsche would have rejected the humanist’s claim to value and meaning as being too idealistic and optimistic. If so, then we have no reason for objecting.
A constant theme in Nietzsche’s perspective is the idea that humanity is on its own, i.e., no God or transcendent reality to guide him. * Maybe what we should say is that for Nietzsche any meaning and value that man derives are to be gotten from a realistic appraisal of the human condition, not an idealized, overly optimistic one. Accordingly, we would say that evolution and psychology are as pertinent to any humanism as rationality and a scientific orientation.
Moreover, there’s a side to Nietzsche’s early work that is more encouraging for the secularists among us. This is expressed by Schacht as follows:

He [Nietzsche] has become convinced that only by something like a continuation and radicalization of the Enlightenment thinking, ruthlessly getting to the bottom of things and exposing all false hopes and dangerous palliatives, can afford us at least the possibility of a future worth having and a life worth living. Nietzsche’s dedication to Voltaire was the announcement of an intellectual re-orientation, placing him squarely in the courageous tradition of Enlightenment thought and effort.

Being in “the courageous tradition of Enlightenment thought and effort” surely conforms to the aspirations of many secular humanists. If we invoke a realistic, critical form of humanism, one that recognizes the limitations and actual tendencies in human behavior, we can profit from reading a philosopher like Nietzsche and while retaining a humanistic orientation.

* Jean P. Sartre argued for a existentialist version of humanism in his essay, “Existentialism is a Humanism.” (1946) His main point is that man is on his own; he determines his meaning and value.

The quoted excerpts are from an article • ” The World Without Free Wıll” by Azim F. Shariff and Kathleen D. Vohs

What happens to a society that believes people have no conscious control over their actions?

• In the past decade an increasing number of neuroscientists and philosophers have argued that free will does not exist. Rather we are pushed around by our unconscious minds, with the illusion of conscious control.
• In parallel, recent studies suggest that the more people doubt free will, the less they support criminal punishment and the less ethically they behave toward one another.

In reference to the man who choked his wife to death while sleepwalking, unaware of what he was doing..)

Such cases force people to consider what it means to have free will. During sleepwalking the brain clearly can direct people’s actions without engaging their full conscious cooperation. Recently an increasing number of philosophers and neuroscientists have argued that—based on a current understanding of the human brain—we are all in a way sleepwalking all the time. Instead of being the intentional authors of our lives, we are simply pushed around by past events and by the behind-the-scenes machinations of our unconscious minds. Even when we are wide awake, free will is just an illusion.

Philosophers with this viewpoint argue that all organisms are bound by the physical laws of a universe wherein every action is the result of previous events. Human beings are organisms. Thus, human behavior results from a complex sequence of cause and effect that is completely out of our control. The universe simply does not allow for free will. Recent neuroscience studies have added fuel to that notion by suggesting that the experience of conscious choice is the outcome of the underlying neural processes that produce human action, not the cause of them. Our brains decide everything we do without “our” help—it just feels like we have a say.
Not everyone agrees, of course, and debates over the existence of free will continue to rage. . .
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Robert, thanks for an interesting article from Scientific American on one of my favorite subjects: The philosophical quandary concerning free will.  I agree with the authors that if people believe that humans lack freedom of action and humans are caused to do what they do by events and conditions out of their control, then there would be dire consequences for people’s ethical behavior and their treatment of others. Of course, if one is not responsible for what one does then those disposed to exploit and cheat will do so, while denying any and all responsibility. The consequences for our legal system and ethical/moral conventions would be dire. I also agree with their statement that most people who deny that anyone ever acts of his own free will favor penalties that are intended to reform and deter bad behavior over penalties that are retributive and mete out punishment for the sake of punishment.

“As our research has suggested, the more people doubt free will, the more lenient they become toward those accused of crimes and the more willing they are to break the rules themselves and harm others to get what they want. Thus, the second possibility is that newfound skepticism of free will may end up threatening the humanitarian revolution, potentially culminating in anarchy.”

They suggest that a possible solution is to reinvent belief in free will.

“More likely is the third possibility. In the 18th century Voltaire famously asserted that if God did not exist, we would need to invent him because the idea of God is so vital to keeping law and order in society. Given that a belief in free will restrains people from engaging in the kind of wrongdoing that could unravel an ordered society, the parallel is obvious. What will our society do if it finds itself without the concept of free will? It may well reinvent it.”

However, avoiding such utterly bad consequences for society surely does not require the invention of a mysterious faculty called free will. This is because the problem of free will should never have been laid in terms of the question: Does free will exist? Of course, it does not. But that is entirely irrelevant to real questions about human freedom or the lack of it.

There isn’t any  human faculty of free will. Modern neurology, evolutionary biology, and the cognitive sciences have established this much. Materialists (philosophers) have also known this for centuries. There is no such thing as free will.
But from this is does not follow that humans lack the capacity to act ‘freely,’ in the sense that in many cases (most cases for some) people do what they want to do and what they think is in their best interest. It does not at all follow that people are not in conscious control of what they do. (Imagine that we believed this screwy proposition. Would we get in our cars and drive the public streets and roads?) It also does not follow that people are not responsible for their actions, or open to blame when they screw up and credited with commendation when they do well.

In many cases (in most cases for those fortunate enough to live in a free, open society) we are not pushed around and compelled to act by external causes, such as a powerful, totalitarian state, or in the case of slavery, by the slave master and his police force. And even in many cases in which unconscious motivations cause us to act in uncharacteristic ways, we’re still generally responsible for what we do, unless our situation is a pathological one  (We are not sleepwalking. We are not drunk or in a drug-induced stupor.).  There are exceptions to the general fact that humans are responsible for what they do. These are exceptions which are recognized by medical professionals and the legal systems. But exceptions do not make up the general conditions of human behavior. It is false on the face of it, that “we are all in a way sleepwalking all the time.”

Humans are organisms bound by laws of physics, chemistry and biology. And, if I allow for the sake of argument that the “universe does not allow for free will,” (in the sense of a faculty that is unaffected by physical causation), then we could agree that there’s no free will in the universe. But that mysterious, metaphysical, spiritual entity called ‘free will’ is not at all a necessary condition for affirming that in the ordinary meaning of freely chosen actions – doing what one desires to do and what one judges to be in one’s best interest – people act freely much of the time.

Yes, we are conditioned to varying degrees by all kinds of neurological conditions, physiological conditions, genetic conditions, environmental conditions, etc. We don’t live and act in a vacuum free of external and internal causation. But this does not prove or even offer compelling evidence for concluding that we never make meaningful choices and act responsibly. To say that, because of the conditions that affect how we act, nobody is to blame for wrongdoing is just as much a fallacy as saying that because an artist was affected by a large set of external and internal conditions, that artist should not get any credit for his works of art.

The entire business of denying free action and affirming a universal determinism is quirky business right from the start. I can understand how philosophers might fall victim to sloppy thinking on this; but surely scientists who should approach matters critically and with skepticism should never have fallen for the pseudo problem of free will.

Iconoclast: One who attacks and seeks to destroy widely accepted ideas, beliefs, etc. A destruction of the icons or idols.

“The destroyer of weeds, thistles, and thorns is a benefactor whether he soweth or not.” — Robert G. Ingersoll

“What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground language on which they stand.”
—- Ludwig Wittgenstein

We’re familiar with those figures in the history of Western philosophy who questioned and undermined the beliefs and doctrines of their society, starting with some of the Pre-Socratics, the Sophists, and Socrates himself. Among the great figures in Western thought are a number of skeptics, certainly skeptical of religious doctrine, and other critical thinkers who rejected many of the prevailing social, political, and philosophical beliefs. Walter Kaufmann pointed out that two of the major philosophical trends of the 20th century, Analytical philosophy and Existentialism, were primarily revolts against much of what had come before in philosophy. So the idea of the philosopher as an iconoclast is not a new one.

But what about the Iconoclast who targets philosophy itself, who works to undermine fundamental ideas in philosophy? Is this a good or bad thing?  Much depends on what people mean by “philosophy” and the fundamental ideas of philosophy. It seems that we would have to identify these before we can say whether an attack on them is a good or bad thing.   The charge that the activity of philosophy is a waste of time would itself seem to be based on some ‘philosophical’ presuppositions. Some critics of philosophy from the field of science often make the charge that philosophical disputations are a waste of time.

There are a variety of attitudes that persons take with regard to philosophy. Among them are the attitudes of reverence (on one end of the scale) and iconoclasm (on the other end). The reverent attitude assumes that traditional philosophy expresses truth, or at least important aspects of truth; and that the scholar’s job is to render favorable interpretations of the text so as to bring out those important insights and truths. Contrary to this, the iconoclastic attitude mostly presumes that much of what traditional philosophers have written and uttered was confused and resulted from a lack of the knowledge that scientific development has provided.

Of course, there is a range of attitudes between the two extremes of reverence and iconoclasm. For example, the scholarly attitude that finds value in traditional philosophy but recognizes that the major figures in philosophy also got much wrong and were confused on important points. Another example coming from the far side of range is the critic who agrees with the iconoclast that much in traditional philosophy was wrong and misguided, but finds important lessons to be gotten from the errors of the philosophers.

“It is all a body of confusion and pre-scientific falsehoods and errors! It is best to ignore it all together.” So speaks the iconoclast, who often sees traditional philosophy as too closely aligned with religious doctrines and theologies, and thus not worth much of our time if we seek objective knowledge and clarity.

The moderate iconoclast emphasizes the degree to which philosophical theories and systems are the expressions of an age and a culture. There is a particular style of thinking and ‘psychology’ behind the philosophical expression which reduces (if not eliminates) philosophy’s claim to objective truth. In other words, the moderate iconoclast recognizes that philosophy is culturally and individually conditioned. Seen in these terms, traditional philosophy has much to teach us, but what it teaches is not the overarching ‘truths’ that some readers of philosophy have claimed.

There is at least one good answer to the question: Is iconoclasm good or bad for philosophy? It all depends on the kind of iconoclasm involved. The extreme form of iconoclasm that rejects everything that history and tradition offer is likely to overlook the value to be gotten from those sources. Is there value to be gotten? Yes, in any honest attempt to understand things, no matter how dated or erroneous, there is something of value to be learnt. Given a shared humanity, we learn at least how members of our tribe are inclined to think and where they’re inclined to search. Applying those lessons to our contemporary situation can be very valuable.

On the other side, a naïve reverence for traditional philosophers and philosophical systems will not contribute to our understanding and appreciation of what preceded us in the field of philosophy. Uncritical reverence is an attitude more appropriate to religious piety than it is to the spirit of philosophy. The uncritical, reverent reading of Holy Scripture and the writings of the founders of a religion is contrary to the critical spirit that philosophy should cultivate.

It may be that the proper terms is “respect” rather than “reverence.” An attitude of respect is consistent with recognition that imperfect human beings have worked in the field of philosophy and produced. Whether reading Plato, Spinoza, or Kant, we can appreciate the problems they confronted and their way of dealing with those problems while recognizing their limitations and the ‘wrong turns’ they took. We can appreciate and recognize their “genius” while acknowledging their overstatements and false generalizations. A reverent approach would deny that these great figures made any significant errors; whereas an extreme iconoclasm would deny they have anything of value to offer. Both extreme positions are faulty.

Reverence – (A bowing before the great figures.)
Such figures as Plato, Aristotle, Kant always get the benefit of the doubt – our interpretation will always be sympathetic – Our aim to is to illuminate the truths of the past.

Iconoclasm – (A destruction of the icons?)
Generally we reject the views of traditional figures as not applicable to our current problems and concerns. – Our aim is to undermine respect for tradition and thus focus on contemporary ways of dealing with problems. This may imply rejection of philosophy en toto.

Reform – (Reformation of the tradition.)
We try to give past philosophers their due, but we don’t hesitate to criticize and correct; our aim is to reform philosophy.
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Iconoclasm is a preliminary step to Philosophy as Reformation.

The philosopher as a social critic. We see philosophy as criticism and evaluation of society’s values and institutions, often as rejecting the ‘idols of the tribe.’ This is a type of iconoclasm.

Some will argue that his is but one function of philosophy; and that other functions include expression and defense of culture’s values and institutions.

Some might ask: What gives philosophers this authority? Is not philosophy a part of the culture? How can philosophy take the role of critic and evaluator without assuming a perspective from outside of that culture?

Is it not true that any concentrated degree of thought and reflection leads one to question actions, practices, and policies? Questioning a convention sometimes leads one to reject that convention.

When a philosopher proposes a different perspective on things, he insinuates a rejection of (or at least a suspension of adherence to) the current perspective.

(Using the terminology of F. Bacon) Among the idols of the tribe that we should scrutinize: ancient myths, religious doctrines, the political and economic order, class structure, moral values, social view of reality, and other things.

Consider the reformer. Isn’t his first task that of undermining and eventually destroying the undesirable institution? His target might be a social institution such as slavery. First, he raises awareness among the general population by a sustained critique. Then, going beyond this, he works to undermine and eventually destroy the undesirable, old way of operating in favor of a new way.

“The idols and false notions which are now in possession of the human understanding, and have taken deep root therein, not only so beset men’s minds that truth can hardly find entrance, but even after entrance is obtained, they will again in the very instauration of the sciences meet and trouble us, unless men being forewarned of the danger fortify themselves as far as may be against their assaults.
Lastly, there are Idols which have immigrated into men’s minds from the various dogmas of philosophies, and also from wrong laws of demonstration. These I call Idols of the Theater, because in my judgment all the received systems are but so many stage plays, representing worlds of their own creation after an unreal and scenic fashion…”
— Francis Bacon

A Philosophical correspondent (Sam) discusses definitions of  “God” and a critics objection:

Our secular critic criticized  John’s  definition of God as infinite power, intelligence, and goodness by noting that this defines God as a collection of abstract concepts. Perhaps what he meant was that there’s something wrong with defining God in terms of abstract concepts, even if we mean them figuratively rather than literally. If so, I think he’s right. It makes of God an object of the understanding and encourages rationalists to frame the problem of God as if it is just another challenge for science to tackle. This puts human understanding in a god-like position while putting God in a position of object in relation to humanity’s god-like subjectivity. That kind of thinking, which is typical of the Enlightenment concept of reason, was the target of Kant’s First Critique. But not many people seem to have got the message, retaining the Enlightenment concept of reason in their understanding of science.

Then  Sam offers a “better definition”:

” … here is my suggestion for a better definition of God. God is love. That, of course, is not my original idea. It’s a platitude. It is expressed in a familiar hymn that says, ““God is love, and he who abides in love abides in God and God in him.” Even the Beatles said “All You Need Is Love.” St. Paul’s famous discourse on love in Corinthians, 13 spells out the nature of love.
” If God is love, we do not understand God; we feel Him. We know what love is because and to the extent that we feel it. Fortunately our biology inclines us to fall in love, and everybody who falls deeply in love gets a lesson on what love is. I would describe it as a kind of happy energy. The description of God as energy is not bad, for energy is the source of nature. And it is not hard to see that true happiness is not in being loved, but in loving. When I love, I abide in God, and God abides in me. That is more a matter of experience than of faith.
“When Jesus was challenged to name the most important commandment, he said that it is to love God with your whole heart, mind, and soul. I think of that less as a commandment and more as advice. It’s the best advice you can get, because it yields the greatest happiness. For the love of God is an all-inclusive love. That’s why the second commandment, to love your neighbor, is “like it.” But loving God does not come easily or naturally. I work at it every day. Little by little, I succeed more and more, and the more I succeed the happier I become. The great thing about marriage is that it gives you, in your spouse, a concrete focus for your practice. Your spouse is by your side every day, all the time. If you feel a growing love for your spouse, your love for God is growing. Even if you don’t believe in God, to grow in love is to grow in God.”

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Then I responded that despite my low estimate of much theology and most god talk. I would indulge in a form of anthropology of god belief.   I entered the arena.

When I questioned John’s list of abstract ‘powers’ as definitive of God, I was not thinking along the lines that Sam  suggests. I was not rejecting John’s definition because it makes God a subject for the understanding rather than one for ‘feeling.’ Yes, it is true that some people  who indulge in god talk advance this notion of god as an object for feeling, particularly, an object of love. But much of Catholic theology, especially as advanced by Thomas Aquinas, sticks with the notion of God as accessible to reason and subject to rational philosophy. It is strange to me that anyone dedicated to philosophy would propose the “theology of feeling” as the best bet for stating what theists mean by “God.”

Continuing with my anthropological critique of god talk, I’ll point out that the only basis for saying anything about any alleged ‘god’ is by taking note of the behavior of those committed to that ‘god.’ When we do (looking at the long, bloody history of god belief), we find anything but expression of love. What we find is violence, aggression, and the use of ‘god’ as a club to beat down the opposition. If we try to infer the ‘god’ at issue, it is not one in which God is Love, at all. This does not rule out exceptions, people who try to practice their religion as a form of love for humanity. And, yes, there is much expression of this sentiment in much religious literature, starting with scripture.

But as a philosophical statement of the nature of God, the God-is-Love proposition does not sound very promising. Yes, it might make sense that some people try to follow the advice to “love God with whole heart, mind, and soul.” (Good luck with that one!) But the reciprocal love of God for his creatures surely smacks of a cruel caricature when you consider that Christian God is ready to commit the bulk of humanity to eternal fires of Hell. (God’s love means often having to say you’re sorry: “Sorry, you poor, imperfect human schmuck, but it is to Hell that I send you!”) Even the good, loving Jesus hardly expresses love for all (despite Christian propaganda); consider his condemnation of all (e.g. the pharisees and scribes) who don’t accept his word as the Word of God. This is hardly the mark of love.

Maybe the ‘God is Love’ is a comforting sentiment for some, but it hardly stands up to the least level of scrutiny. (The intellectual conscience is left wanting, to say the least!)

(So much for venture into the anthropology of god talk.)