Author Archives: jbernal

Robert Wright’s Failed Tactic: His Promotion of Teleology in Natural Selection.

One of the many confusing points advanced by Robert Wright in his recent book, The Evolution of God, is the claim that the ideas of a purpose and an end (for which organism are “designed”) are found in the Darwinian philosophy of evolution by natural selection. In other words, Wright, while trying not to be too obvious about it, argues for a form of teleology in biological evolution. He even attempts to recruit Daniel Dennett, a well-known exponent of Darwinian natural selection. We can admire Wright for his tireless effort, but ultimately there are good reasons for rejecting his attempt to show that teleology is part of Darwinian natural selection. Wright’s surprising move is a tactic that fails; as I will show, his attempt to “recruit” Dennett on his behalf is without merit. When we look closely at what the Darwinian philosopher, Daniel Dennett, says concerning natural selection we find a categorical rejection of the idea that purpose plays any role in Darwinian natural selection.

First, let’s look at how Wright brings out his case:

On page 402 (The Evolution of God), Wright gives us the following:

Indeed, so special is natural selection that lots of biologists are willing to talk about it designing organisms. (Or, actually, “designing” organisms; they tend put the word in quotes, lest you think they mean a conscious, foresightful designer.) Even the famously atheist Darwin philosopher Daniel Dennett uses that kind of terminology; he says this process of “design” imbues organisms with “goals” and “purposes.” For example: organism are “designed” to pursue goals subordinate to that ultimate goal, such as finding mates, ingesting nutrients, and pumping blood.

The take-home lesson is simple. It is indeed legitimate to do what Paley did: inspect a physical system for evidence that it was imbued with goals, with purpose, by some higher-order creative process. If the evidence strongly suggests such a thing, that doesn’t mean the imbuer was a designer in the sense of a conscious being; in the case Paley focuses on, it turned out not to be. Still, the point is that you can look at a system and argue empirically about whether it has, in some sense, a “higher” purpose. There are hallmarks of purpose, and some physical systems have them.

“Well, the entire process of life on Earth, the entire evolving ecosystem — from the birth of bacteria through the advent of human beings through the advent of cultural evolution, through the human history driven by that evolution — is a physical system. So in principle we could ask the same question about it that we asked about organisms; it could turn out that there is strong evidence of imbued purpose, as Paley and Dennett agree there is in organisms. In other words, maybe natural selection is an algorithm that is in some sense designed to get life to a point where it can do something — fulfill its goal, its purpose.

(p. 402, The Evolution of God, Little, Brown, and Co., 2009)

As has been the case throughout much of his book, Wright tends to equivocate. On the one hand, he tells us that the process of design imbues organisms with “goals” and “purposes”; but adds that biologists don’t really mean a “conscious, foresightful” work of a designer. He discounts Paley’s argument for a conscious designer (i.e., a creator God); but affirms the notion of design in nature in the sense of a “higher purpose.” But then he tells us that “Paley and Dennett agree there is [imbued purpose] in organisms,” suggesting that Dennett (and his kind of Darwinist) agree with Paley that some kind of purpose works in biological evolution.

Any casual look at a dictionary definition of “purpose” shows that the word connotes a purpose in some mind or arranged by some intelligent being. For example:

Webster’s New World Dictionary defines “purpose” as 1.something one intends to get or do. Intention, Aim 2.Resolution, determination 3. the object for which something exists or is done. It gives as synonyms: INTEND, INTENTION.

Obviously, our definitions of purpose imply connection with a mind or intelligent giver of purpose. When Wright mentions “higher purpose,” he surely insinuates some aim or goal set down by some intelligent agency. Throughout his book, he relies a lot on the Logos concept, which he takes from the ancient Jewish theologian, Philo. Obviously Wright’s “higher purpose” working in history is another way of referring to Philo’s Logos principle.

But this talk of “higher purpose” and the Logos is a long way from anything that Daniel Dennett wrote about in his exposition of Darwinian Natural selection in his book, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea.

Dennett elaborates his interpretation of Darwin’s theory [my highlighting]:

“What Darwin discovered was not really one algorithm but, rather, a large class of related algorithms that he had no clear way to distinguish. We can now reformulate his fundamental idea as follows: Life on earth has been generated over billions of years in a single branching tree —the tree of life— by one algorithmic process or another.” (Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, Simon & Schuster, 1995, p.51)
“ . . . Here, then, is Darwin’s dangerous idea: The algorithmic level is the level that best accounts for the speed of the antelope, the wing of the eagle, the shape of the orchid, the diversity of species, and all the other occasions for wonder in the world of nature. It is hard to believe that something as mindless and mechanical as an algorithm could produce such wonderful things. No matter how impressive the products of an algorithm, the underlying process always consists of nothing but a set of individually mindless steps succeeding each other without the help of any intelligent supervision; they are “automatic” by definition: the workings of an automaton.(Ibid., p. 59)

Dennett sees this process of natural selection as being a type of algorithm:

“Darwin offered a skeptical world a scheme for creating Design out of Chaos without the aid of Mind. . . The theoretical power of Darwin’s abstract scheme was due to several features that Darwin .. identified, and appreciated better that many of his supporters, but lacked the terminology to describe explicitly. . . Darwin had discovered the power of an algorithm. An algorithm is a ..formal process that can be counted on —logically— to yield a certain sort of result whenever it is “run” or instantiated. . . [Algorithms have an] underlying mindlessness: Although the overall design of the procedure may be brilliant, or yield brilliant results, each constituent step, as well as the transition between steps is utterly simple. … simple enough for a dutiful idiot to perform — or for a straightforward mechanical device to perform.

(Ibid., pp. 59-60)

Dennett elaborates on this interpretation of Darwin’s theory:

As we well know, Darwin showed that higher, complex forms of life evolved from lower, simpler forms of life by the natural selection alone. Thus, we have refutation of the traditional view that complexity could never arise from the less complex except by intervention of an external, intelligent designer

. (Ibid, p.153)

Dennett states the upshot:

“Darwin explains a world of final causes and teleological laws with a principle that is … mechanistic but —more fundamentally — utterly independent of “meaning” or “purpose” . .

(Ibid, p.153)

In summary, Daniel Dennett shows that the main thrust of the Darwinian response to all creationists and intelligent design advocates is that the wonderful complexity and apparent design found in nature can be explained on a strictly natural, material basis. Yes, it is understandable that we should stand in awe at the physical laws that governed the formation of the universe, at the incredibly fine tuned forces and physical relations, at the unimaginable complexity of the DNA molecule and other building blocks of life, and at the workings of the brain leading to the emergence of high level mental activity (Mind); and understandable that some commentators, like Robert Wright, should invent signs of purpose and design in all this.

Ironically for Mr. Wright, Dennett’s main work on Darwinian natural selection is a categorical rejection of people like Robert Wright (“those who find signs of purpose and design”). We can reject his misguided suggestion that Dennett endorsed his misbegotten, undeveloped philosophy of a “higher purpose” working in the biosphere and universe too.

Was it God or Monica Lewinsky?

How did we get there, GW Bush as leader of the western world for two terms?

I recall that during his first term, GW Bush reportedly said that God had called him to the presidency. He said this in a conversation with one of his favorite tele-evangelists, maybe Billy Graham. My reaction was NO WAY, BUSH! God had nothing to do with it.

So how did we come to have the most mediocre of all mediocre presidents elected twice (2000 and 2004) to lead the nation? I would argue that his election in 2000 came about because of these factors: Monica Lewinski, whose sexual dalliance with Wm. Clinton hurt the Al Gore campaign; the electoral college, which gave Bush an electoral victory despite the fact that Al Gore won the popular vote nation wide; election fraud in Florida, followed by a political decision by conservatives on the Supreme Court giving junior Bush a very questionable victory in Florida.

So we had this not-quite-ready-for-prime-time man as our president for a four-year term, during which the tragedy of September 11, 2001 happened, followed by the so-called ‘war on terrorism.’ And GW Bush and his team exploited this to the hilt. He became a “war president.” His political operatives,led by Karl Rove, set about scaring voters into thinking that, unless the administration’s policies were followed, we would lose the war to the terrorists. So we came to the election of 2004, in which the Republican strategy was to convince voters that unless we retained the glorious leader, our Commander-in-Chief, the terrorists would eat us up. The strategy was successful. Of course, the Karl Rove dirty tricks and swift-boat-campaign smearing of John Kerry also helped. So in 2004, with questionable returns in Ohio, the voters returned this less-than-fabulous GW Bush to the White House.

It wasn’t until later in the second term (2006) that voters finally woke up and detected the true colors of Mr. Bush and rejected his Congressional Republican allies in the 2006 mid-term election. After the tragic failures of the Iraqi policy, the utter incompetence in dealing with the Katrina disaster, the corruption and ineffectiveness of the Congressional Republicans, the mess in the Justice Department created by Cheney, Rove, and Gonzales, and a few other events — only then did the majority of citizens finally awake to the fraudulence, corruption, and general incompetence of the GW Bush administration.

So who were the best allies to the GW Bush political fortunes? Try Monica Lewinski and Osama bin Laden (and his merry bunch of terrorists). Without these elements, our man GW Bush would never have come within shouting distance of the White House.

Isn’t the study of history wonderful?

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Another note regarding the appearance of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker before the congressional committees to explain the so-called troop surge in Iraq: General David Petraeus looked great in his General’s uniform, with all those ribbons and silver stars. Obviously, the congressional committee members were star struck! By comparison, the ambassador to Iraq, Crocker, looked very drab in his businessman’s suit. Why didn’t Petraeus lend him a few ribbons to make him look impressive too?

(I asked my wife to make me a jacket like Petraeus wore, with ribbons and silver stars. But she refused.)

Charles Rulon: Science, God and the origin of life

Here I offer more interesting and insightful remarks by Charles Rulon on the question of the origin of life and the issue of synthesizing life in the laboratory.
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Origin of life research

By insisting on naturalistic hypotheses instead of falling back on “God did it,” many of the key steps in the transformation from inani­mate matter to living cells are now understood in con­sid­erable detail. Major dis­coveries in the past 60 years have already led to creating genetic material, pro­teins and other biochemical structures that begin to bridge the gap between non-life and life. In fact, some researchers are now in the process of build­ing their own living cells from scratch. Others are slowly fill­ing the gap between their computer models which simu­late evolu­tion and the actual biochemistry lab, itself.

Still, many puzzles re­main—puzzles that are fuel for God beliefs. A few theistic scien­tists have written books about the “finger of God” being necessary to bridge the gap between non-life and life. But such theistic arguments, strongly re­futed by other scientists, don’t lead to new experiments, so just tend to stop research.

Q. If scientists can’t explain life’s origin, how can they be sure of our evolution?

A. The overwhelming evidence in support of evo­lu­tion does not come from origin of life experi­ments, but from the millions of al­ready dis­covered fossils, genetic analyses, plus numerous other converging lines of solid evi­dence. As an analogy, just because scientists haven’t made a chicken egg from scratch doesn’t mean that chicken eggs don’t develop into chickens.

Q. Aren’t living cells much too complex to have evolved naturally?

A. First, microscopic fossil evidence indicates that ancient cells were far simpler than most cells found today. Second, and of considerable significance, there never has been a clear-cut distinction between what is obviously alive and what is not. Instead, a continuum exists.

There are viroids which are short circles of genetic material, yet are respon­sible for over a dozen different plant diseases. There are viruses (genes surrounded by a protein coat), not considered alive because they do not have cells and need a host, yet not exactly dead either, since they have genes, can reproduce, and can evolve through natural selection. These viruses come in all shapes, sizes and levels of complexity. There are even entities called satellites—metaviruses that can replicate only within a virus that is already inside a host cell.

In 1992 there was the discovery of a truly monstrous virus officially known as Mimivirus (because it mimics a bacterium in many ways). This virus has more than 900 genes and is much more genetically complex than all previously known viruses, not to mention a number of parasitic bacteria. With the Mimivirus, the boundary between viruses and bacteria became officially blurred.

There is now considerable evidence that viruses were involved very early on in the evolutionary emergence of life. Most of the genetic material on this planet appears to be viral in origin. Their ability to interact with organisms and to move genetic material around make viruses major players in driving the evolution of new species. Half of all human DNA is believed to have originally come from viruses.

Most living cells today have a nucleus. Some scientists believe that a large DNA-based virus took up residence inside a bacterial cell more than a billion years ago to create the first cell nucleus. If so, all life forms today with nucleated cells may have descended from viruses.

Even so, there still exists an ancient line of microbes known as the archaea, which have no nucleus and may make up as much as one-third of all life on earth.

Q. Isn’t it still possible that God inter­vened to create life from non-life and even to guarantee our evolution?

A. How is that hypothesis scientifically testable? Besides, even if there were a god somewhere in the origin and evolution of life picture, that still doesn’t mean by any stretch of logic that this god must be the God of the Christians. Maybe this “cosmic being” merely evolved humans as “fast food” for his truly chosen species which is now touring our galaxy.

The basic problem, of course, with all such God beliefs from a scientific perspective is that such beliefs tend to stop re­search. To glibly say that God did it is mere­ly to give ignorance a name. We’ll never get closer to discover­ing how life might actually have originated if we keep filling in our gaps in knowl­edge with “God did it” answers.

What we do know so far is that the scientific evidence currently supports the hypothesis that “life” gradually appeared through an accumulation of genetic typos committed by hordes of mindless microscopic “replication machines”. What we do know is that the more scientists have learned about liv­ing things, the clearer it has be­come that all of life’s processes, from fertili­zation to the evo­lu­tion of the human brain, appear to be based entirely on chem­ical and physi­cal laws. No laws of na­ture have been bypassed or bro­ken. No extra mira­cles or “vi­tal forces” seem to be required. It just doesn’t seem neces­sary (and hasn’t for a long time now) to posit super­natural inter­ven­tions for the origin of life or for human evolution.

by Charles L. Rulon. Emeritus, Life & Health Sciences
Long Beach City College
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Key web sites for progress on the origin of life problem: : Devoted to the astro­nom­ical, chemical and biological aspects of the origin of life problem. : This is NASA’s “Origins” program page. : A “Scientific American–Ask the Experts” site where concise, up-to-date information on what we know about the origin of life is given.

In the mid-l950′s Dr. Sidney Fox, a spe­cialist in pro­tein biochemistry at the Univer­sity of Miami, and his colleagues heated a dry mixture of amino acids. The amino acids automatically hooked together to form chains of from 30 to l00 amino acids long. These “pro­tein­oids,” as Fox named them, were strik­ingly similar to true proteins and, according to Fox, could have served as the raw material from which life evolved. Not only did protein-like macro-molecules automatically formed from amino acids, but when these proteinoids were exposed to water, they automati­cally formed little spheres which have many properties similar to today’s cells. There are num­erous published research­ed reports with copious data showing that many modern proteins appear to have derived from a few such ancestral proteins.

By 1993 computer scientists, microbiolo­gists, chemists, physicists, mathe­maticians and evolu­tionary theorists had succeeded in creating creatures that looked and acted very much like living organisms. They grew, ate, repro­duced, mutated, fought with each other and died—and they did all this spontane­ously, with­out inter­ference or help from their human creators (Levy, S., Artificial Life: The Quest for a New Creation -1993).

By 2010 see Scientific American: http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=the-real-promise-of-synthetic-biologyFollow Craig Venter’s progress: http://biosingularity.wordpress.com/2010/01/31/craig-venter-talks-about-creating-synthetic-life/

Evil Does Not Exist?

At a recent meeting of our local Humanist group we heard two guest speakers from the Bahai faith. Their talk was interesting and informative regarding this religion, one which most of us do not know very well. I was particularly interested in one remark regarding evil and suffering in the world. One of the speakers repeated a principle of the Bahai faith that evil is the absence of good, and has no positive reality in itself. Hence, for the Bahai there is no problem of evil.

You’re probably familiar with the problem that evil in the world presents for major mono-theistic faiths. The problem can stated in terms of “Epicurus’ old questions”:

Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? If so, then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence evil?”

[From David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion ]

The Bahai ‘solution’ to the question of evil represents one way taken by a number of advocates of religious theism in the history of this problem. A number of theologians and religious philosophers have argued that evil really does not exist, but is only the absence of positive reality.

However, for many others, including people of religious faith, this simply is not a ‘solution’. It is undeniably a fact that humans inflict evil on others. The suffering resulting from war, torture, even genocide, and gross injustice – all these are real. How can anyone be content to assert that only good things really exist (such as moral virtue and intellectual excellence) and bad aspects of life, such as evil, suffering, and ignorance really don’t exist? Surely this simply flies in the face of the facts of reality. Suffering, disease, persecution, and genocide are neither fiction, fantasy, nor illusion. They really happen to real people, whether we admit their reality or not.

Great literature and great art can bring home these unwelcome facts of life. For example, in his great novel, The Brothers Karamazov, (1879-80) Fyodor Dostoevsky wrote an emotionally wrenching exchange between two Karamozov brothers, Ivan and Alyosha (“Rebellion”). Ivan takes up the case of the horrendous suffering of children, something he cannot accept as justifiable or subject to theological, philosophical explanation. Even if someone were to prove that children’s suffering was a necessary condition for achievement of ultimate harmony, he would reject that ‘truth.’ The suffering of one innocent child cannot be justified by a higher purpose or harmony to be achieved, and certainly cannot simply declared to lack reality.

A recent PBS Drama “God On Trial” (2008) brings to life the ordeal of Jewish men imprisoned at Nazi death camp (Auschwitz) and awaiting execution. They put God on trail on charge of violating the covenant with the Jewish people. In the process we get a dramatic presentation of the indescribable evil inflicted on humans by other humans.

The implication that Ivan’s impassioned cries in the piece “Rebellion” and the profound search for meaning and explanation in face of Nazi evil by the victims at Auschwitz really do not refer to a positive reality is simply unacceptable. Resorting to the comforting belief that evil lacks reality simply will not do! When we try to make rational sense of human reality, evil and horrendous, suffering are factors we cannot wish away.

Charles Rulon: Was Roe vs. Wade a Mistake?

In this set of remarks, my friend Charles Rulon, exposes and refutes several falsehoods that we often hear concerning the landmark court decision on abortion: Roe vs. Wade.

Was Roe v. Wade a Mistake?

1. Claim: Roe v. Wade was liberal judicial activism:
Reply: If the constitutional protection of our individual rights means anything, then the freedom to decide whether or not to endure pregnancy must be deemed a fundamental right. The Roe v. Wade opinion was written by Justice Blackmun, a conservative Republican appointed to the Court by President Richard M. Nixon. Also supporting Roe was Chief Justice Warren Burger (also a conservative and a Nixon appointee) and conservative Justices Potter Stewart and Lewis Powell.

2. Claim: Very few competent experts agreed with Roe:
False. In 1989 a “friend of the court” brief was filed on behalf of 885 American law professors who held that the right of a woman to choose whether or not to bear a child is an essential component of constitutional liberty and privacy. Trying to force women with unwanted pregnancies to be little more than breeding machines — embryo incubators against their will — is a fundamental freedom issue; it’s essentially a female enslavement or bondage issue that has no place in any 21st century scientifically literate, ethically advanced society.

3. Regarding the fact that the “right to abort” does not appear in the U.S. Constitution:
Neither do phrases like “freedom of thought” or “parenthood rights” or “liberty of association” or “freedom of marital choice”. The American Bar Association’s House of Delegates by a vote of 238 to 106 approved a resolution in 1990 expressing the ABA’s recognition that “the fundamental rights of privacy and equality guaranteed by the 8th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution” encompasses “the decision to terminate a pregnancy.” In fact, when the U.S. Constitution speaks of persons, it is quite obviously referring to just one definition of person, those already born. For example, the 14th Amendment says that all persons born in the United States are citizens, not “all persons conceived”. Our Constitution is a living document with many amendments added over the years, not a stagnant archaic parchment steeped in the ignorance and prejudices of two hundred years ago.

4. Regarding equality under the law:
We have laws that protect us from being forced to use our bodies against our will to keep other people alive (such as being forced to give blood, or bone marrow). These laws are strongly supported by society. Yet, anti-choice activists want to force women with unwanted pregnancies to use their bodies against their will to keep unwanted mindless embryos alive. Thus, laws restricting access to abortion forcefully discriminate against women. They place a real and substantial burden on women’s ability to participate in society as equals.

5. Regarding disrespect for the law:
Restrictive abortion laws have never stopped the large majority of abortions anywhere on earth (including the U.S.) according to a 2007 study from the Guttmacher Institute and the World Health Organization. Instead, such laws have brought about widespread disrespect for the law and have criminalized millions of desperate women each year who’ve attempted to self-abort or sought out dangerous illegal abortions.

6. Regarding the claim that abortion murders pre-born babies:
Embryos are not babies. The vast majority of Americans know this. That’s why they DON’T want women who elect to abort to be sent to prison as accomplices to murder, not even for a day!

Charles L. Rulon, Emeritus, Life & Health Sciences, Long Beach City College

Stumbling Around and Mumbling about Metaphysics

…metaphysics is that division of philosophy that deals with first principles and seeks to explain the nature of being or reality (ontology), and deals with the origin and structure of the world (cosmology). It is closely related to the study of epistemology.

From Webster’s definition of “metaphysics”
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Metaphysics has also often been called “speculative philosophy.”

Question: If one attempts to clarify and explain the nature of human existence, is one doing a type of metaphysics?

The same question can be posed concerning attempts to explain what we mean by the self and mind.

Questions and issues such as those concerning “language and the world,” “science and truth,” and “religious culture and truth” may also be part of a contemporary effort in metaphysics. But this would have to be clarified.

Let’s try a working “definition” of metaphysics: for much of modern, critical philosophy: it is an attempt to sort out and clarify concepts like ‘reality,’ ’existence,’ ‘truth,’ ‘matter,’ ‘mind,’ ‘subject,’ ‘object,’ ‘cause-effect.’ It is a project in conceptual analysis and explication.

Traditionally, metaphysics has been the attempt to explain the nature of reality, or to give a comprehensive picture of reality; or to show all that is presupposed by our language and concepts regarding the world, or to disclose the reality that underlies appearances or the phenomenal world.

Of course, today, many hold that constructive, speculative metaphysical systems are rendered obsolete by the work of the sciences, both natural and social. (Of course!)

For a good, philosophical treatment of the subject see Bruce Aune, Metaphysics, The Elements.

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Questions and thoughts after reading Reuben Hersh’s book
What is Mathematics, Really?

Does mathematics discover truths about a super-sensible realm (Platonism) or is mathematics just a very complex, logical game (Formalism)?

Reuben Hersh points out that work in well-established regions of mathematics is much like discovering new ‘facts’; whereas innovative work that results in new theorems and new insights is akin to creative work (inventions?).

Suppose we think of math as a structure. What kind of structure is it? Is it analogous to the Himalayas and the Grand Canyon? Alternatively, is it analogous to the skyscrapers of New York City?

Mathematics is in part a structure (an object?) and in part a process. The term “object” connotes some stability and endurance.

Hersh’s discussion of the difference between object (a ‘continuant’) and process is relevant to any attempt to analyze (describe) reality. (A song and a symphony can each be understood as an “object” and, alternatively, as a process.)

On some interpretations, modern physics implies that all physical-material reality can be described as processes, that there are no such things as static objects. (..unless we allow mathematical objects).

Time is an important factor: Over a relatively short time a person may seem to be an object. (It seems correct to say that persons are entities enjoying an objective, real existence.) But over longer periods of time a person’s existence is more of a process: infant, child, youth, adult, middle aged, and oldster. (“time-worms”?)

Intuitively we take a body as an object, but more accurately it is a body-in-process.

Mathematics and religion (theology) contribute to our habit of seeing ultimate reality as a grand object, deity as an absolute, transcendent object. We then tend to overlook aspect of reality which is process.

[“Human existence is a process in which objects come and go.”]

Our reality features processes, events, happenings and constantly changing scenes.
In some cases, we see a progression, a movement towards a goal. Time plays a crucial role.

Quantum physics tells us that at the sub-atomic level the distinction between process and object-hood disappears. And at the atomic level, things (atoms) seem ambiguous between process and object-hood.
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Language and thought reify the world:
Can we say that most things that we recognize as (categorize as) objects are really objects-in-process? (Didn’t Immanuel Kant teach us that categorization precedes recognition?) For example, language categorizes things (cup, house, tree, dog) as objects having relative stability and endurance. But over a relatively longer period of time, they are more clearly processes. Time is an important factor.

We think of the human brain itself (the human nervous system) as an entity, but surely the brain (nervous system) is an organ (organism?) in process.

It is our thinking and our language that categorize the world into entities and relatively static objects. In actual reality most likely nothing is static. (No physical entity is ultimately static!)

Maybe processes-events, rather than objects, should be seen as the “constituents” of the world.
(Was this Whitehead’s metaphysical philosophy? Did Bertrand Russell also view reality this way, in one of his many philosophical phases?)

The natural universe is a vast, magnificent process. Within it, an individual life is just a very brief interlude.
(With apologies to Shakespeare: An individual life, a poor player who stumbles on stage and mumbles a few lines, a few insignificant lines, and then is extinguished.)

Is reality an interplay between limited stability and endurance, on the one hand, and process (dynamism, change), on the other?

By means of abstraction (language, concepts, mathematics) we impose the illusion of stability on a fluid reality.

The illusion of stability (and objectivity?) ignores the crucial role that time plays. [Did Plato have an aversion to time and change?]

“You cannot step into the same river twice.” (Heraclitus?) On subsequent entries, both the river and you have changed. In a strict sense of “same” the river is no longer the same and the subject is no longer the same. Endurance, stability, object-hood are relative concepts. Are they ultimately illusions?

How much stability and endurance are required to apply the term “same thing”?

Our sense faculties, our brain, and our language categorize aspects of our experience into objects (things that have stability and stand apart from our experience. (e.g. the cup and pencil on my desk, my very desk itself).

Over a relatively short period of time, one may correctly (in a practical sense) refer to such things as “objects,” having some stability and endurance. But over longer periods of time, it is more correct, more accurate, to refer to these ‘things’ as mere phases of a long process. (A some point in time, they were manufactured out of other material; for a time they have endured as familiar objects: pencil, cup, desk. But later they will break down, deteriorate, decompose, and the material composing them will become parts of other processes.)

By extension, the same can be said about our entire world (the world that we experience) and the same can be said about ourselves (humanity).
[Related notions here: entropy, slippage, “the wearing-down effect of time”]

Absolutely objective, stable, enduring existence is reserved for God, Platonic realms and mathematical ‘objects’. Here we have the “timeless” realm of theologians, Plato and Platonic mathematicians and certain metaphysicians. [Mathematical ‘objects’ are better described as “tense-less.”]

Physicists tell us that entropy is a diminishing of heat-energy-organization.

There are temporary suspensions of entropy (a temporary hold on “slippage”):
There is a modicum of stability within a context of persistent change.
There is enough stability for culture and language to take hold.
Our biological nature (nervous system), our culture and language build a working world, but underlying this is a reality of evolution, unceasing process and change.
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Some writers (e.g. Bruce Aune, Metaphysics, The Elements ) divide up the subject of metaphysics as follows:

a) Ontology – analysis of the general category of ‘being.’ Associated concepts are those of ‘reality,’ ‘existence.’ This is an attempt to say what the general nature of reality is. Sometimes it will also involve the distinction between concrete and abstract reality, and that between appearance and reality.

b) Special metaphysical issues such as those of determinism and freedom; material and mental existence; nature of personal identity; God and spiritual realms; reality and appearance.

Metaphysical philosophy cannot be advanced independently attention to epistemological issues. But many enthusiasts of metaphysics and mystery forget this.

Let me recommend a scientific metaphysics: reality is substantially what the sciences say it is.

Reality is what is disclosed by the natural sciences, historical sciences, empirical investigation and rational inquiry.

Of course, there are dissenters. Some serious and philosophically interesting; some starry-eyed, undisciplined and given to rhapsody. The world, whether object or process, is large enough for all of us.

The Expansion of Brooklyn and Puzzles about Physics

Recently I heard an exchange concerning some of the mysteries of theoretical physics. Two friends, Raul and Samuel, exchanged views on one of the paradoxes of QM found in an article, “The quantum world,” which appeared in Newsweek a few years ago.

Raul: …. how on earth can the electrons go through the slits and THEN have the blinds opened? The time for that to occur is in nanoseconds I would imagine. Can physicists really “fool” the electrons in the way described? Is it possible that the future could effect the present? That would mean the future is really already here in some sense. At any rate, it boggles the mind!

Samuel: Not only do we have a wave-particle duality, but we also have the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle (uncertain what that is?). I have tried to argue with you that — with Special & General Relativity, superstrings, higher dimensions, & brane theory — the future exists (as well as ‘will exist’); I went on to argue that a Transcendent Super-Entity that existed in higher dimensions could sense the future as well as the past and thus sense/detect what ‘will’ happen & thus It knows our Future. But the future can never influence the present – otherwise, causality is destroyed!

Raul and Samuel left me in a state of bewilderment. “Higher Dimensions,” “brane theory,” and “the future already existing”?! Add this to the idea that the future can affect the present and we’re really lost?! My head was spinning!

Then I recalled Alvy’s mother and decided it was time to consult with her.

Remember her, from the Woody Allen movie “Annie Hall”?

Below is the text from the opening scene in Annie Hall when the mother has taken the young Alvy Singer to the family doctor:

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MOTHER: He’s been depressed. All of a sudden he can’t do anything.

DOCTOR: Why are you depressed, Alvie?

MOTHER: Tell Dr. Flicker. [Answers for him.] It’s something he read.

DOCTOR: Something he read, huh?

ALVY: [Head down.] The universe is expanding.

DOCTOR: The universe is expanding?

ALVY: Well, the universe is everything, and if it’s expanding, someday it will break apart and that will be the end of everything!

MOTHER: What, is that your business? [Then, to the doctor.] He stopped doing his homework.

ALVY: What’s the point?
….
MOTHER: What has the universe to do with it? You’re here in Brooklyn, and Brooklyn is not expanding!

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I like Alvy’s mother. She tells it like it is. BROOKLYN IS NOT EXPANDING and THE FUTURE DOES NOT INFLUENCE THE PAST!
So stop worrying and do your homework!

In all seriousness, admittedly quantum physics presents us with tough paradoxes. But it is a mistake to translate the language and formulations of the world of sub-atomic particles (where the arrow of time is irrelevant) to the world of macro-size objects. Our evolved brains/minds, our natural languages, and our intuitive concepts do not apply to the quantum world. Any attempt to apply them results in paradoxes and nonsense.

But this shouldn’t surprise or alarm anyone, right? Listen to Alvy’s mother!

Remarks on determinism and causal explanation

The philosophy of materialism holds that all scientific explanation is done in physical terms; but this should not be read as implying that the materialist claims that reality is structured according to a mechanistic, causal scheme. Someone advancing the philosophy of materialism does not need to assume universal causation. The propositions that reality is causally structured and that all events are linked in a universal chain of cause-and-effect are metaphysical propositions which are not principles of sciences. They can be omitted from a philosophy of materialism. So where does this leave determinism, the view that generally events are connected in cause-effect schemes?

Rather than being a metaphysical claim about the structure of the universe, determinism can be stated as a guiding principle for some scientific and rational inquiry. This principle states that, more often than not, rational inquiry or scientific investigation proceeds as the search for causal explanations. Of course, an exception must be kept in mind: a good number of the sciences, including modern physics, do not always proceed this way.

Causal explanation applies the concepts of cause and effect. As N.R. Hanson points out (see his book, Patterns of Discovery), this type of explanatory scheme is both conceptually- and theory-laden. This means that when we identify an event as cause (or consequence), we presuppose specific understanding of the relevant concepts and theories. Seeing natural events in terms of causal connections is not a simple seeing devoid of theory.

From N.R. Hanson’s Patterns of Discovery:

“..what we refer to as causes is theory-loaded from beginning to end.” (54)
“The terms of physics .. resemble “pawn,” “rook,” “trump,” and “offside”–words which are meaningless except against a background of the games of chess, bridge and football.” (57)

“Seeing what causes a clock’s action requires more than normal vision, open eyes, and a clock: we must learn what to look for.” (59) . . . The chain account [of causality] obscures this by ignoring it: it treats the world as a simple Meccano construction with observers and cameras. But causes are no more visual data simpliciter than are facts. Nothing in sense-datum space could be labeled ‘cause’ and ‘effect.’ (59) [Recall David Hume’s arguments in this light.]

“Causes certainly are connected with effects; but this is because our theories connect them, not because the world is held together by cosmic glue. The world may be glued together by imponderables, but that is irrelevant for understanding causal explanation. The notions behind ‘the cause of x’ and ‘the effect of y’ are intelligible only against a pattern of theory, namely one which puts guarantees on inferences from x to y.” (64) . . “That happenings are often related as cause and effect need not mean that the universe is shackled with ineffable chains, but it does mean that experience and reflexion have given us good reason to expect a Y every time we confront an X.” (65)

———————-
Norton’s point seems to be that the causal scheme is a conceptual scheme (theory-laden) which philosophers apply to nature. Like many conceptual schemes, it results as much from what we bring to experience as from the actual connections in nature. Furthermore, the scheme of universal, causal determinism is an optional model of nature, one that may or may not be correct.

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The cause-effect scheme, applicable to many real happenings in the world, is itself a conceptual scheme that humans apply in order to achieve some understanding of reality. This conceptual scheme itself is subject to rational critique and evaluation.

When it is applied to certain areas of reality, the cause-effect scheme works much like an empirical proposition. We can observe causal connections that hardly anyone would question, e.g. physical happenings like billiard ball examples, relations between temperature and pressure, sunlight and organic growth, and such.

Of course, even in the physical realm, evidence of these causal connections will vary. In some cases, few would question the claim that specific happening has an identifiable cause, e.g., the billiards ball case. In other cases, we operate on the assumption that the event in question has a specific cause(s), although we might not be able to identify the cause, for example, the result of a coin flip.

In other areas, such as those of human actions and social phenomena, although few deny general application of the cause-effect scheme, specification of cause-effect becomes even more questionable. The cause-effect scheme functions more like a presupposition of our attempts to explain things rather than following directly from observation. Hence, we might have cases in which we do not know, and have no way of learning, the actual cause(s) of the event or action, but assume that there must be such a cause. [See N.W. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, Chapter 3 - Causality.]

—————————————————————–
The claim that “all events are causally determined” refers primarily to our explanatory scheme. In order to explain and understand event ‘B’, we look for causal condition “A” which explains ‘B’. [For example, the cause of his illness was the yesterday’s insect bite.] Given an adequate knowledge of event “A” (insect bite) one could infer ‘B’ (subsequent illness). Does this imply a claim as to the nature of reality, vis-a-vis ‘B’? It could, in part, but we should not get carried away. In some cases, such as that of the insect bite and consequential illness, this connection can be established by the applicable science.

But in other cases, the connection is not so clear. For example, when “D” is ‘the decision to invade Iraq’ and “C” is ‘the set of events and conditions preceding the decision’ the causal connection is controversial. Here it is obvious that we are dealing with a conceptual issue. Given certain conceptual presuppositions and a common intellectual culture (assumptions, language), we claim (along with all those who participate in our intellectual culture) that C caused D. Have we thereby shown that ‘C caused D’? Have we shown that this “causal connection” follows from our knowledge the structure of reality? At the very least, this is a debatable proposition concerning “D” (decision to invade Iraq) and “C” (set of conditions and events preceding the decision).

How could anyone ever show that the structure of reality implies that, given “C”, it was inevitable that GW Bush would decide to invade Iraq? The proposition becomes even more doubtful, even verging on nonsense, when the claim is that everything that happens, all historical, psychological, cultural events, all individual actions and such, are inevitable. All this seems part and parcel of a metaphysical philosophy that advances certain, unexamined propositions purporting to describe the structure of reality. (?)

Other than theoretical presuppositions and philosophical assumptions, there aren’t any compelling reasons for asserting that the simple, mechanistic cause-effect scheme describes the structure of all physical reality, much less the structure of all biological, psychological, social and cultural reality.

Work in the following areas would not have advanced much if the controlling principle had been the assumption of simple, mechanistic cause-effect in all of nature: quantum physics, relativity physics, biological sciences, evolutionary theory of natural selection – genetics, etc

Much work in theoretical physics is based on mathematical models, rather than a cause-effect scheme. Any scientist relying on a strictly deterministic picture of the universe would soon find that he was unable to explain all the genuine and apparent randomness in nature, both at the quantum level and at the macro level.

Finally in the areas of the social sciences and humanities, the assumption of a simple cause-effect scheme is of limited usefulness, and the notion “ultimate inevitability” is not helpful at all. Can anyone seriously propose that we could explain such phenomena as history, culture, the arts, literary genius, religious phenomena, etc. as simply inevitable chains of causally-conditioned events?

In Defense of Ethical Naturalism

An email correspondent, call him “Sam”, argued against ethical naturalism as follows:

Naturalistic Ethical philosophy can advance conditional imperatives, but I don’t see how it could sanction a categorical imperative. Ethical Naturalists (“EN” for short) can say, “Be compassionate, because in the long run you’ll be happier,” but they cannot say “Be compassionate, period.” So ENs cannot sanction compassion in every circumstance, but only in those circumstances where the expected advantage has a realistic chance of occurring.

Many moral acts are sanctioned by law (laws against fraud). But is there anything which obligates us to obey law? Maybe the desire to be a good, honest citizen? But what do we say about situations where the desire for some other good (security, wealth, power) is stronger than the desire to be a good citizen? What, if anything, obligates our obedience to the law in those situations?

ENs (ethical naturalists) may have many reasons for wanting to seem virtuous always and everywhere, regardless of the circumstances. But do they have any reason that obligates them to be virtuous always and everywhere, regardless of the circumstances? If they do, it’s a reason that cannot easily fit within their metaphysical framework.

Suppose that the naturalist has had some kind of intuition or intellectual insight telling him that virtue or a good will is an absolute good. He may then continue believing that he’s a naturalist, but in actuality he is no longer a naturalist. For he has presumed an absolute, and in nature there are no absolutes.

I propose a rejoinder to Sam’s claims about the limits of “naturalism.”

First, I have some doubt about his example of “sanctioning compassion”:
Can anyone or anything sanction compassion? Can we demand or obligate people to be compassionate? Isn’t compassion something you feel for others, more an aspect of your character or personality than a response to an external sanction? There is the possibility of training or educating people so that they eventually come to feel compassion for others; but genuine compassion is not something you can impose on people. At best, you might be able to sanction behavior which approximates compassionate behavior; and maybe that’s good enough.

Now, to the substance of Sam’s case:

According to Sam, naturalism lacks any grounds for issuance of categorical imperatives. It cannot impose unconditional obligations to act virtuously, but only conditional imperatives to act virtuously when doing so will result in desirable consequences.

“Naturalists may have many reasons for wanting to seem virtuous always and everywhere, regardless of the circumstances. But I don’t think they have any reason that obligates them to be virtuous always and everywhere, regardless of the circumstances. Or, if they do, it’s a reason that cannot easily fit within their metaphysical framework”
This is because, “in nature there are no absolutes.”

In short, according to Sam, moral absolutes are not available to naturalists, as naturalists. They could not justify the goal of trying to be virtuous under all circumstances.

Let’s take an example: the act of torturing babies. Naturalists could never justifiably hold that such an act is wrong in all circumstances. That would involve an absolutist sanction, which naturalist cannot support. Hence, any naturalist who holds that torturing babies is always a moral wrong is hiding some non-naturalistic principles in his closet.

I have serious doubts about this line of argument. It seems that Sam equates ‘naturalism’ with a type of consequentialist ethics which requires that all moral values be justified in terms of consequences, which will vary so much that no moral rule (such as that forbidding the torture of babies) could be unconditional. (This is a common tactic used by supernaturalists against secular moralists.)

There are a number of replies to this, of which I give two:

(1) A Utilitarian could argue for a rule utilitarianism which asserts nearly unconditional rules (for all real-world circumstances) as ultimately justified in terms of the well-being of society. It’s very hard to imagine circumstances in which the torture of infants would be admissible. The fact that you don’t get a metaphysical absolute becomes largely irrelevant on a moral plain, although it might be interesting to those prone to engage in metaphysical speculation.

(2) By nature (evolution of the tribe, kinship, parental instincts and feelings), cultural development, training, education, experience and such] — individuals come to acquire strong feelings of compassion for other human beings, especially helpless, innocent infant. These strong feelings and concerns —along with practical, rational, social considerations— lead to strong, unassailable rules against the torture of babies. It is hard (practically impossible) to imagine circumstance in which we would over-ride such moral rules against the torture of innocents. This “quasi-absoluteness” of moral rule is good enough. The philosophical observation that metaphysical absoluteness is not obtainable becomes mostly academic and irrelevant. In other words, the viability of the secular, naturalistic ethical philosophy is not much affected by the metaphysical qualms that some ‘philosophers’ might feel.

Final note: The advocate of moral transcends imagines that he possesses those absolutes which allows for genuine categorical imperatives. But these ‘absolutes’ ultimately turn out to be very human in origin, based (as they are for naturalists) on experience, conditioning, and specific, human theological interpretations of codes attributed to supernatural authority, but which can be traced to some human or group of humans. Ultimately, the ‘absolutes’ of the religious authoritarian are in the same category with the ‘absolutes’ of any human-based morality.

‘Jesus’ and NBA Legends – Can we expose the fact hidden in myth?

The teachings of the Jewish sage, Yeshua, are converted into a Hellenized doctrine, which itself is transformed a few centuries later into a Roman institution.
By analogy, a future legend converts two players, Wilt Chamberlain and Bill Russell, into a basketball miracle worker, ‘Russell-Chamberlain.’

a 21st century wag

Problem Presented:

Even a religious skeptic might allow that a person, Jesus, existed, if by ‘Jesus’ we understand the male person who lived and taught in the first century around the regions of Galilee and Jerusalem, who attracted a following, practiced a form of faith healing and was executed by authorities (Romans?). A reasonable hunch is that likely such an individual did exist, and that he is the basis for the ‘Jesus’ of the Gospels — which is a composite figure, for sure. Of course, the issue would remain as to the distance between the putative historical figure and the ‘Jesus’ depicted in the New Testament. Recall that the ‘Jesus’ of the synoptics (Mark, Matthew, Luke) is a very different figure from the ‘Jesus’ of the gospel John; and the “Christ” figure of Paul’s writings different from the prior two.

Any cursory look at relevant scholarship on the issue indicates that there are great differences between different versions of ‘Jesus’. This brings us to the problem of identity. Even when we grant that most likely there was a historical ‘Jesus’ — it is very difficult, maybe impossible, to establish which of our numerous references and descriptions might be accurate.

Supposing that could expose the historical fact regarding this person ‘Jesus’ we would have to dig through numerous strata of religious doctrine, myth, legends (oral and written), and political perspectives. Even for the dedicated, critically minded scholar-historian, the flesh-and-blood person who walked the hills of Galilee remains mostly lost in the fog cast by subsequent doctrinal and political development and historical events.

Sometimes analogies help to shed more light on the point one tries to make. Let us try the following analogies.

Inconsistent references or reports:

Suppose that you and I are reminiscing and seem to recall that we both knew a particular individual fifty years ago, call him “Bill.” I ‘recall’ that Bill was a younger school mate (a class two years behind ours) and that he was an All-State football player, but a poor student academically. But you ‘recall’ that Bill was older (graduated ahead of us), did not play football, but was an outstanding musician and consistently on the honor role. Surely our first suspicion would be that (besides having faulty memories) we’re referring to different individuals when we use the name “Bill.” A second suspicion might be that neither of us really knows what he is talking about; that each of us has constructed a fictional person “Bill” based on bits and pieces of memories that we haven’t sorted out well. Maybe the ‘Bill’ we think we remember never existed. .

Reports inconsistent with known facts:

We agree on what we remember of Bill (of fifty years ago) and we agree that he was a veteran of the war in Vietnam. But fifty years ago the war in Vietnam had not yet happened. So as we ponder this disturbing fact, we begin to suspect that the ‘Bill’ (Vietnam War veteran) that we think we ‘remember’ could not have existed, that we have confused him with someone else or are simply wrong when we refer to this ‘Bill.’

Mixing of facts, fiction, legends, and myths:

You and I have a fairly clear idea who Bill was and what he did (and did not do) fifty years ago. But then we hear some persistent stories about Bill that are circulating among the younger set, people who were too young to have known and interacted with Bill. These stories seem to refer to the same person —Bill who lived fifty years ago in our home town— but the stories describe a very different person from the Bill we knew. This other ‘Bill’ is credited with doing a number of things that we know he did not do (and could not have done). The younger folk even have a club, founded on what they see as the teachings of Bill, which has attracted many people and has done much to help people . . . . . However, despite the good works done in the name of “Bill, we conclude that, with regard to historical fact, the younger folks do not know what they’re talking about, that they have concocted a fictional or legendary ‘Bill’ loosely associated with the real Bill we knew but who (as described by the younger set) really did not exist.
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A Confusion Easily Resolved:

A few years ago an email correspondent and I discussed the merits and demerits of Kobe Bryant, Los Angeles Laker star player. I compared Bryant to Bill Russell, the Boston Celtic great who led his team to a record number of NBA championships. I felt that as a team player who could make his team mates better players and work a team into a winning outfit, Russell was incomparable. In rebuttal, my correspondent then pointed out that I had forgotten to mention Russell’s 100 point game and his 50 point scoring average. Of course, what happened was that my friend had mixed up Wilt Chamberlain’s exploits mixed with Bill Russell’s. We quickly corrected and clarified the matter.

But we could do this because Russell and Chamberlain played only forty years ago, and we were there, so to speak (both of us being over 60 years of age and long-time NBA fans). We remember from first-hand experience who these great centers were, which teams they played for, and what they accomplished. And even if our memory should fail us, we can consult plenty of other people who know about them and plenty of documentation (e.g., archived newspaper reports, books, film, etc.) to which we can refer.

The Russell-Chamberlain legend:

Imagine, however, that the situation were different. Imagine the same conversation (re. Russell and Chamberlain) taking place far in the future, when nobody existed who had first-hand experience of their playing days; and when documents and reports about them were sketchy and problematic. Imagine that we weren’t even sure that “Russell-Chamberlain” referred to one or two or maybe more individuals. Imagine further that none of the surviving reports were by first-hand witnesses to Russell-Chamberlain’s exploits, that the reports were written centuries after the Russell-Chamberlain playing days. Now add that differing reports arose from competing schools of thought (call them BB-churches”) regarding the Russell-Chamberlain question. According to one BB-church, Russell-Chamberlain really had been a great center who played for the Celtic-Warriors-Lakers, who led his team to 15 NBA championships, and who averaged 100 points a game one season. Another BB-church denies this and claims there really were two players who played for different teams and accomplished different exploits, which are incorrectly listed: one led his team to 20 consecutive NBA championships; the other was a great scorer who averaged 75 points a game for his entire career. In short, the facts are murky; and we really cannot say with great confidence that we know who Russell-Chamberlain was (or were) and cannot say what he (they) really accomplished, even when we assume that this great NBA figure(s) really did exist.

Now to add to the mystery, suppose that the most influential BB-church came about because an energetic historian-promoter, Pablo the 557th, who wrote that Russell-Chamberlain was a minor player who became an incredible coach, almost supernatural in his ability to transform mediocre teams into NBA champions. According to this BB-church, the important thing is to study the Russell-Chamberlain coaching philosophy which guarantees to transform your average team into an NBA champion-caliber team. This teaching and Pablo 557’s reports completely ignore any mention of the playing career of Russell-Chamberlain, as if this were a minor matter of no importance whatsoever. This leads some commentators to speculate that Pablo 557 did not have any knowledge of playing career of Russell-Chamberlain, and since Pablo 557 is considered the leading authority, that maybe there was no actual NBA center named Russell-Chamberlain, and that the “Russell-Chamberlain” revered by subsequent generations was an almost supernatural coach named “Russell-Chamberlain” who appeared out of nowhere.

So, in this context, how could we ever hope to unravel the mystery? How could we ever say confidently that Russell-Chamberlain really did play in the NBA or that our figure is actually two distinct players, or that our NBA figure was actually a composite of multiple players? How could we ever speak with confidence of the exploits of either one of these great NBA figures of the past? How could we say that one really did lead the Boston Celtics to 10 consecutive NBA championships? Or say that he was not a great scorer, but a great defender, rebounder, and team leader? Or say that the other one played for the Philadelphia Warriors, the San Francisco Warriors, and the Los Angeles Lakers, and really averaged 50 points a game for one NBA season, and was the only player ever to score 100 points in one game?

I submit that we would not have any basis for making such statements.

Some future scholar-historians might argue that there is evidence indicating the existence of two NBA greats, a ‘Bill Russell’ and a “Wilt Chamberlain” who have been mixed up as one individual by BB-religious tradition. Some isolated and ignored scholars might also argue (mostly in vain) that the official Russell-Chamberlain figure, venerated by the dominant BB-churches, is just an invention of Pablo 557, who was a great writer, organizer, and promoter. But the prevailing opinion would be that Russell-Chamberlain was one great coach, whose teachings only fools will ignore! The historical exploits of two NBA great centers, Bill Russell and Wilt Chamberlain, would remain hidden in the fog of history and religious propaganda.