Author Archives: jbernal

Abortion Laws Make Slaves of Women

“Compulsory pregnancy is a form of slavery. . Prohibiting tax-funded abortions for the poor and requiring parental notification compounds violence against women.”

—John Swomley, Professor of Christian Social Ethics,
Saint Paul School of Theology, Missouri (1960-1984.)

In philosophy most of our discussions and debates on abortion focus on such issues as the status of fetus, the rights of the fetus in relation to the rights of the woman, the stage of pregnancy at which the abortion takes place, and whether destruction of the fetus amounts to the killing of an innocent person. However, such discussions, as stimulating and instructive as they may be, do not set the primary issue which preoccupies others (both in and outside the field of philosophy). They are primarily concerned about the rights and dignity of the women facing reproductive choices.

One of my regular lunch companions, CR, is a good example. CR is a retired science instructor at a local college, Emeritus in Life and Health Sciences. He makes a strong plea for the rights of women with regard to compulsory reproduction in the following remarks:
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Compulsory Pregnancy

An investment in global reproductive health care (sex education, contraception and early safe abortions) would provide one of the greatest benefits to humanity in the history of civilization. Few other measures could make such a contribution to the health and well-being of women and children, reduce poverty and improve our chances of achieving a sustainable future, yet cost each of us in the affluent world only a few dollars a year in foreign aid.

But today, the uncompromising position of the Christian Right toward women with unwanted pregnancies puts an ugly face on social justice and on the religious spirit of love and compassion. It’s a position that demeans the intelligence and moral character of women and returns them to the Dark Ages of compulsory pregnancies and dangerous illegal abortions. How long will we continue to tolerate authoritarian pronouncements from popes, bishops, preachers, televangelists and born-again politicians—essentially all MEN—MEN who are primarily concerned with the maintenance of power and ancient religious dogmas in a modern scientific world they do not want to understand?

“Power is key to understanding the
cynical manipulation of faith and the assault on reason”

—Al Gore

The United States has laws that protect us under normal circumstances from being forced to use our bodies against our will to keep other humans alive (such as being forced to give blood or bone marrow). Yet anti-abortion activists want to force women to use their bodies against their will to keep unwanted mindless embryos alive. How can any society ever expect its citizens to live in ways that are higher and nobler when it attempts to force women with unwanted pregnancies (a common reality throughout history) to stay pregnant against their will—to be unwilling embryo incubators?

Where is the social justice in forcing these women to be obligatory breeding machines? Where is the religious wisdom in placing women essentially in reproductive bondage to the state? When will all Americans finally step up to the plate and strongly endorse the right of women everywhere to be able to control their own reproductive futures—a right that is fundamental to female equality and human liberty?

CR

Humanism without Overt Atheism

The opposite of the religious fanatic is not the fanatical atheist but the gentle cynic who cares not whether there is a god or not

– Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (1951)

“God is an invention of Man. So the nature of God is only a shallow mystery. The deep mystery is the nature of Man.”

—- Nanrei Kabori (late Abbot of the Temple of the Shining Dragon, a Buddhist sanctuary in Kyoto) quoted in Shadows of our Forgotten Ancestors, by Carl Sagan and Ann Druyan

A good way to see humanism is as a philosophy that rejects the god-centered picture of reality, but also rejects the idea that overt atheism should be an essential part of that humanism. Humanism is thus seen as a philosophy whose primary focus is on the human and natural aspects of reality.

We can imagine our preferred humanist to speak as follows: “I don’t believe in a deity, but I don’t dwell on that fact. I focus my attention on science, the arts, literature, philosophy, history, technology and all other achievements of human culture. In the moral sphere, I try to do “godly” work, instead of puzzling over imagined obligation to the will of an imaginary supernatural being.”

Should a humanist espouse atheism? Many do and think that genuine humanism requires that the humanist proudly exhibit his or her atheistic colors, so to speak. Humanists do not need to reject all forms of ‘atheistic activism’ as being inappropriate to humanism; however, a humanist should not dwell on the atheistic issue.

But this should not be understood as implying that my preferred humanist espouses theism, although some do; nor should it be seen as implying that my humanist will be an agnostic concerning the question of deity, although some will be.

My preferred humanist, (call his a “critical humanism”) has moved beyond the question of belief or non-belief in deity. This humanistic perspective has progressed beyond the god-centered perspective of the past.

Much of overt atheism is still in the grip of that god-centered perspective of reality insofar as it remains tied up with the question of deity. This is the case when the primary activity is the effort to deny and disprove the existence of deity.

In religious cultures dominated by monotheistic religion, such as our culture, the idea of God has played a central role, even in periods when pockets of skepticism and non-belief appear. A person’s perspective on reality was characterized as one of belief in deity or a rejection of that belief. A person of faith has traditionally been opposed by an atheist and by the skeptic.

‘Critical humanism’ can work to shift this pivotal point of view from a god-centered, supernatural perspective — whether in affirmation or denial — to a human-centered, naturalistic perspective. A consequence of this shift is that a person’s basic perspective is no longer defined on the basis of belief or disbelief in God.

When we view humanism in this way, it can be seen as bringing about a shift in thought analogous to the Copernican shift in astronomy, which shifted our thinking from an earth-centered planetary system to a solar-centered one. Likewise, humanism can be seen as involving a shift in our thought from a god-centered perspective to a human-centered perspective. Attention shifts from the supernatural, whether in affirming or denying it, in favor of one focusing on human culture, history, human creativity and achievements; and of course, on reason, science, secular morality, mathematics and technology. *

In the context of ‘critical humanism,’ the term “atheist” is a label belonging to the god-centered culture. One could even argue that the active promotion of atheism, as a philosophy, is part of a general promotion of the old division between faith and non-faith of the old culture.

A critical humanist sees all ‘gods’ as supernatural beings invented by religious cultures acting on the religious imagination. There is no rational or moral obligation to believe in any of these imaginary beings. Neglect of the supernatural is the extent of the ‘atheistic’ position of the critical humanist.

* A critical humanist recognizes that this shift in thought takes time and not easily made by many who have lived in the grip of the old perspective. Hence, a critical humanist does not denigrate persons simply because they continue to see things from a god-centered perspective. (Analogy: the shift in paradigm, e.g., the very hard to make transformation in thought from classical physics to quantum physics; even such a genius as Einstein had great trouble with it!)

Dredging up the Past: Vincent Bugliosi and GWBush Deceptions

“Even the most courageous among us only rarely has the courage for that which he really knows.”

F. Nietzsche, “The Twilight of the Idols”

Logicians, scientists and philosophers often refer to the logical fallacies of inference from false negative (failing to recognize evidence that is available, hence failing to draw the correct conclusion) and inference from false positive (invalidly drawing a conclusion from imagined evidence, that which simply does not exist). If nothing else, the happily departed GW Bush administration gave us great examples of each of these fallacies, the first admissible as a misstep or mistake in reasoning; the second more a case of deceptive tactic of persuasion, than a simple misstep in reasoning.

False Negatives: The GW Bush administrations completely ignoring all the signs of an impending attack on the U.S. by Al Qaeda between Jan 20, 2001 and September 10, 2001

[Investigated and reported by the 9/11 Bi-Partisan Commission, an investigation opposed by GW Bush and hindered at every turn by the administration’s lack of cooperation. ]

False Positives: All the false ‘evidence’ touted by the GW Bush administration for claiming that

a) there was a connection between the Saddam Hussein Iraqi government and the al Qaeda terrorists who attacked on 9/11 and their leader, Osama bin Laden; and

b) Iraq possessed WMDs and posed a serious military threat to the United States.

[The “false positives” fallacy was part of a well-coordinated, highly deceptive campaign to persuade Congress and the American People that an invasion of Iraq was required.]

But, of course, all of this deception by the Bush administration is history now; and we should move on to current challenges and problems instead of dredging up the past. GW Bush is gone. Forget about him! Right?

Vincent Bugliosi does not agree. He reminded me of these shameful acts (call them fallacies if you like) by the GW Bush administration, and reminded me also about the shameful capitulation by Congress, the news media, and citizens in general. He reminded me of the extent to which we became “sheep-like” in our readiness to be misled by propaganda and lies generated by Bush, Cheney, Rice and the rest of that gang.

Bugliosi reminded me of all this is his 2008 publication: The Prosecution of GW Bush for Murder .

Many of you, of course, will be put off by the title (One cannot possibly imagine that our former PODUS might be a murderer?) and will imagine that Bugliosi is a little nutty, an extreme partisan who has published a sensationalist book not worth considering. If that’s your view, you would be dead wrong. By all accounts Bugliosi is neither nutty nor an extreme partisan. He is an excellent attorney, once one of America’s best prosecutors, possessing a logical, rational mind and the courage to say what others should have been saying. But more importantly, Bugliosi is a citizen who still believes in the ideals and promise of America, and who is morally outraged by what GW Bush and company pulled off and apparently will get away with.

Bugliosi offers well developed arguments for each of his conclusions and provides a wealth of evidence in support of those conclusions, reminding us of all that happened (9/11 attacks, the war on terrorism, the 9/11 Commission to investigate the attacks, and Bush’s adventure into Iraq) during the eight years that Bush was in power. The book inserts photographs showing the death, suffering, and destruction resulting from our invasion of Iraq — juxtaposed with photos of our fearless leader, laughing and clowning around, completely unmindful of the consequences of his immoral policies. As he said once, in reply to a reporter’s question, he and Laura had spent a most enjoyable year (the same year of untold death and destruction in Iraq, and the unjust burden and deprivation for our combat personnel and their families).

I almost wish they had chosen an alternative title for the book, as the one his publisher chose comes across as too sensationalist, probably discouraging serious readers. His book deserves a wide readership.

————
Bugliosi has issued a challenge to our moral conscience, to our commitment to the principle in our laws (nobody is above the law), and to our respect for those who died, who sacrificed, — as a result of Bush’s invasion of Iraq. What answer do we have for not responding? I can only think of the utilitarian answer: more harm than good would result to the nation from going after Bush, Cheney and Rice.

What would it do to the collective psyche of the approximately 50% of voters who elected that team – Bush & Cheney – to lead the nation in 2000 and 2004? What would it say about our election process if those people elected to the White House were later indicted and convicted (hopefully) of murder? As the old cliché puts it, What would it do the fabric of the nation?

Others would point out that there are many more pressing problems to deal with; that going after Bush and Cheney would be disruptive, both politically and socially; and might even frustrate the new administration’s efforts to deal with the gargantuan crises left over by Bush-Cheney.

On the other hand, the nation’s integrity – moral and legal integrity — is at issue. The principle that no person is above the law is at issue. The victims of Bush’s immoral, disastrous war policy cry out for justice and honesty on our part.

Very few are clean in this matter. An overwhelming majority of people, the Congress, the news media, and our valued institutions (religions, educational, legal, philosophical) were persuaded by the official propaganda and went along with Bush-Cheney-Rice-Rumsfeld. We became war mongers! Bush-Cheney acted in our name, the citizens of the USA. Now we (collective agents) are obligated to set things right. GW Bush, Cheney, C. Rice must be brought to justice. They lied, deceived, and abused their power —- and managed to persuade Congress, the news media, and the American people to support their military invasion of a country that was no threat to the U.S. They took advantage of the 9/11 attacks, fear of more terrorist attacks, and peoples’ fear of being branded soft on terrorism.

Our valued institutions — religious, legal, philosophical, educational — failed when all this was happening.

Very few religious or political leaders came out in opposition to the war enthusiasts. Where were our sociologists and philosophers? Very few voiced opposition, and that which was heard was mostly muted and ignored. Our news media, both print and electronic, who are supposed to be “watchdogs” against abuse of power by our officials, failed miserably. Instead of critical analysis and evaluation of policy, they became the “cheering section” for Bush-Cheney.

Does the Bugliosi book suffer because it is merely dredging up old issues, which should best be left alone?

No! The issue of national integrity is not old. The issues of justice and examination of war crime are not old. The need to recognize and compensate the victims of the misguided war policy is not old. The need to examine and re-examine the events that led to our national disaster is not old.

An Exchange of views on ‘Consciousness’

Recently one of my philosophical correspondents and I engaged in the following exchange regarding the concept of consciousness. I offer part of that exchange below with no implication that anything was resolved. At best, we raise the issue of consciousness and touch upon some of the consequential puzzles.

Call him the “S-Factor.” Call me “Moi”

S-Factor:
“My consciousness of what I am doing is irrefutable evidence of the existence of consciousness.”

Moi:
In other words, you claim that the following inference is sound:
1. I am conscious of what I am doing (viz. keying in a sentence).
2. Hence, consciousness exists.

I would agree if all you mean by “consciousness exists” is that there are beings (myself, in this example) who are capable of consciousness; i.e., there are beings (biological beings) who are capable of being conscious of things.

But this means that your valid inference above shows can be restated:
3. I am conscious of what I am doing (viz. keying in a sentence).
4. Hence, there exists a being capable of being conscious. (Or a being capable of conscious states; or, as you might prefer, a being capable of consciousness)

My awareness what I am doing is irrefutable evidence of the existence of a being (namely, myself) capable of being conscious of something or other. The inference then becomes rather trivial. Moreover, one can argue that ‘consciousness’ in this sense is a biological concept insofar as it refers to the capability of a biological being.

Isn’t it true that if I can explain the evolution of beings capable of conscious states I have explained the evolution of ‘consciousness’?

The alternative is to argue that when you claim that ‘consciousness’ exists you’re saying more than simply “beings who are capable of conscious states exist.” But this seems to imply that ‘consciousness’ is an entity or property over-and-above the reality of beings who can have conscious states, that it is “a strongly emergent property of organisms,” as you state it. “Consciousness, at least, is a strongly emergent property of organisms. ”

When you state that consciousness exists are you saying more than I say if I were to say: “Conscious beings (namely, persons) exist”?

Obviously, explaining how animals capable of complex conscious states evolved is a difficult job. But in my opinion it is the job of explaining the evolution of beings (animals) with complex brains and sense faculties, capable of being conscious of their surroundings and eventually capable of self-consciousness and reflection. It is not the job of explaining the “strongly emergent property of consciousness,” with the suggestion that consciousness is something apart from the evolved capability of biological beings.

————————————————————
S-Factor:
You pose the question: When you state that consciousness exists are you saying more than I say if I were to say: “Conscious beings (namely, persons) exist”?

The answer to the question is no. I am not saying more than you would be saying if you were to say that conscious beings exist.

Obviously, explaining how animals capable of complex conscious states evolved is a difficult job. But in my opinion it is the job of explaining the evolution of beings (animals) with complex brains and sense faculties, capable of being conscious of their surroundings and eventually capable of self-consciousness and reflection.

Yes. That’s the job. But is it possible? That remains to be seen. Meanwhile, if we keep using the term “consciousness” but are unable to explain this property in terms of lower level processes, we are at least treating it as a pragmatically emergent property. Furthermore, if we think that we really do have this property, that it is not a mere fiction, we are treating it as strongly emergent.

It is not the job of explaining the “strongly emergent property of consciousness,” with the suggestion that consciousness is something apart from the evolved capability of biological beings.

The phrase “strongly emergent property of consciousness” does not carry the suggestion that consciousness is something apart from an evolved capability of biological beings. In fact, the term “property” in the phrase tells us that we are not talking about a substance in its own right, but about a property of a substance. But until the explanation of the origin of this property is given, it’s an open question how these beings got this property. Any explanation we could give would have to be in terms of some sort of natural process (otherwise we wouldn’t consider it a legitimate explanation), but until such an explanation is given we can’t just assume that there is such a process.

——————————————-
Moi:
Yes, but I still have a problem with your way of stating things, rather your way of framing things. Your way of stating the problem certainly suggests that consciousness is some type of entity (even if you qualify it as a property). The very fact that you assume that there’s a significant issue as to whether it exists or not, suggests to me that you’re leaning very heavily to the idea that consciousness is not simply another capability of human beings, but is something unique (maybe even mysterious). After all, you include an argument demonstrating “irrefutable evidence of the existence of consciousness.” In my previous email, I tried to show that this sounds very strange when you substitute for “consciousness”, “persons who are capable of consciousness.” Is this something that is subject to doubt so that one has to produce arguments demonstrating “the irrefutable evidence that conscious persons exist”?

Also, I question your assumption that “consciousness” is not a biological concept. Many commentators and researchers argue that it is. I realize that this is a debatable issue; but I don’t concede that the consensus is not (ultimately) biological in nature. Again, I believe your assumption is part of an effort (maybe subconscious!) to differentiate “consciousness” as something over-and-above the other unquestioned capacities (abilities) of persons.

You ask whether it is even possible to explain consciousness in biological terms, and again, suggest that this may not even be possible. A number of people in the neurological, cognitive, and psychological sciences have been working this project. Some have even written books. Do such explanatory theories succeed? Maybe not yet, but surely such theories are possible and do much to clarify the issue. Why would you suggest that such a project is not even possible? If not possible, do you then set “consciousness” aside as another profound mystery?

Does Morality Require a Transcendent Order?

ABOUT THE BELIEF THAT MORALITY REQUIRES GOD

A number of people (writers like Dostevsky, for example) have been struck with the “insight” that if God does not exist, then everything is permitted. Another way of stating it: If God does not exist, there is no distinction between good and evil; we’re left in a state of moral chaos in which persons do whatever they can get away with. And no moral law is available to base any moral judgment against the powerful predator, who would destroy and devour the weak. The prevalent condition would be one of extreme relativism and social chaos; morality is whatever any subject cares to define it to be; no one has any basis for moral condemnation of strong monsters, who would have their way with the rest of us.

But obviously everything is not permitted; i. e., we have strong moral sanctions against a broad array of evil actions. We judge against and imprison the criminal predator not simply because we have a system of criminal justice but also because we acknowledge very strong moral rules against the type of action that criminal predators carry out. In other words, we recognize standards of moral behavior that qualify as moral law. Some would even characterize such moral rules as reflecting a moral order in our world.

However, moral order or moral law suggests a supreme moral authority who establishes the basis (objective basis) for moral law. Otherwise, we have the pressing question concerning an objective standard for our moral judgments. But we need the objective standard, or we are thrown into the moral chaos that extreme relativism brings with it.

I believe this is the gist of the argument that some advance for God’s existence on the evidence of our moral experience and moral sensibility. I shall argue that this argument is not sound.

The argument could be stated as follows:

1. If it is false that (God exists), then everything is permitted.

2. But it is false that (Everything is permitted)
———————

3. Hence, it is true that (God exists)) [i.e., false that false that ( God exists).]

(A simple modus tollens argument.)

Of course, the first premise is the key to the argument and the one that any critic would scrutinize. Why should we accept it as a true proposition? Certainly it is not self-evident or an analytical truth. How could anyone ever make a compelling case for the truth of that premise?
The premise expresses a sub-argument:
1) Suppose that God does not exist;
2) It would follow, that everything would be permitted.

But this is compelling only if we already assume that a moral check on human behavior is possible only when there’s a supernatural moral authority to “back up” those moral checks. This simply begs the question. (Certainly if the possibility of any kind of morality rests on the existence of a supreme moral authority, then we would accept the premise as true. But this simply moves the issue one step back.)

As stated, the argument begs the question. For the first premise is no more clearly true (have a higher likelihood of being true) than the conclusion. It begs the question in the same way that an argument having the premise “If God did not exist, there would be no world” begs the question. Why should anyone looking for a rationally compelling argument for God’s existence accept that premise?

What else could the proponent (of moral authoritarianism) claim? Maybe something like: “We cannot make any sense of our moral values unless we see them as ultimately grounded in a supernatural, value-assigning deity.” Of course, here the main problem is one of showing that no one (including proponents of a secular morality) can make sense of moral values on naturalistic terms. (This is has not been demonstrated so as to satisfy the neutral observer.)

Often this controversial proposition is the basis for the claim that non-believers (atheists, agnostics, secular humanists) have no basis for being morally conscientious or making moral judgments of any kind. For (it is held) non-believers have no rational basis for distinguishing between good and evil.

Apparently, here the proposition ‘God exists’ has been replaced by the proposition ‘Pedro believes that God exists’,
and the negative proposition
‘God does not exist’ has been replaced by the proposition
‘Samuel does not believe that God exists’.

Thus, from the perspective of the non-theist:
‘Samuel does not believe that God exists’ implies that from Samuel’s perspective, everything is permitted.

A corollary argument is often advanced:
1. For any person ‘P’ such that P is a non-theist, the implication is that P is an extreme, moral relativist.

2. ‘P’ is an extreme moral relativist’ implies ‘P’ lacks any rational basis for moral judgment or moral value.’

3. Amos is a non-theist
———
4. Hence, Amos has no rational basis for making any moral judgment.
Corollary: Amos does not have a rational basis for distinguishing between good and evil.

(From a rational perspective, Amos would have to accept quietly the actions of the criminal, predator, or the perpetrator of genocide.)

By such line of thinking, the non-theist is made to appear as a moral nihilist and even worse, as someone who (if he is a consistent non-theist) would tolerate the worst evil and the most heinous crimes imaginable).

We also find the following corollary propositions:
• Only the theist with his position of moral authoritarianism has an objective standard for making moral judgments and distinguishing between good and evil.
• Those who believe in God as the ground for moral law can discern what God’s moral law is, and thus make correct moral judgments.
• Those who believe in God can rationally justify their moral beliefs.
• Those who believe in God as the Universal Moral Authority will generally agree among themselves as to what is morally good and what is morally bad.

Unless our talk in moral philosophy is empty, we must allow that moral beliefs and moral judgments that we attribute to people are translatable into action. Hence, if we say that the non-theist is compelled to a position of extreme moral relativism, it must be the case that the non-theist in significant ways acts as an extreme moral relativist.* But we know that is not the case. As many non-theists as theists are morally conscientious and far from extreme relativists on matters of morality. Moreover, if we say that the theist (the moral authoritarian) makes good distinctions between right and wrong and holds correct (true) moral beliefs, then this too should translate into action.

So we could consider these propositions:

• Simply by virtue of his belief in God, a person tends to moral excellence.
• People who believe in God agree among themselves as to what is morally good and what morally bad.

Certainly it would be most difficult to defend these as being true general propositions. I am sure that any person of religious faith or any sectarian, who has not completely gone to sleep intellectually, would have to admit that the propositions are doubtful one, if not outright false. Certainly anyone with simple knowledge of history and current events would at least question these general propositions.

Of course, the final response to the advocate of supernatural moral authoritarianism is that all believers fall short of their extravagant claims. It is false that morality can only come by way of transcendent authority. It is even doubtful anyone’s moral beliefs are really based on the commands of a supernatural law-giver; i.e., the entire squadron of theologians and religious philosophers who argue the point have never made a rationally compelling case for their doctrinal assumption that a Deity exists, much less that this Deity is the ultimate, transcendent authority for all humanity’s moral beliefs. All that they can claim, with some rational justification, is that faith in the authority of a deity, as conceived and characterized by their religious tradition, is the basis for their moral beliefs. In short, their morality is based on their image of God. (And even this, only sometimes.)

One could even propose that the theist shares the same condition (the human condition) with the rest of humanity: Ultimately all moral beliefs are grounded in human experience, and reflection on this experience (in our philosophies and religious scriptures, for example), resulting in certain moral rules. Like the rest of us, theists and super-naturalists are on their own when it comes to morality. They don’t have any access to a transcendental authority who will point them to universal, eternal moral law.

* Surely this has exceptions: a professor of meta-ethics could reach the conclusion that only a position of moral relativism is rationally tenable, yet in his day-to-day conduct, act as if he believed in certain universal moral principles. After all, there is a difference between the intellectual view and moral behavior. Ideally we would like for these to be consistent; but with many people they are not.

George Orwell’s call for honesty and clarity

In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defense of the indefensible. Things like the continuance of British rule in India, the Russian purges and deportations, the dropping of the atom bombs on Japan, can indeed be defended, but only by arguments which are too brutal for most people to face, and which do not square with the professed aims of political parties. Thus political language has to consist largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenceless villages are bombarded from the air, the inhabitants driven out into the countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on fire with incendiary bullets; this is called pacification.

George Orwell, from his 1946 essay, “Politics and the English Language”

Language, Clarity, & Honesty

A few years ago a fellow humanist, Harry Becker, passed me some LATimes articles (11/04/07) under the heading “WHY ORWELL MATTERS.” The articles dealt with themes found in George Orwell’s 1946 essay “Politics and the English Language.” Mr. Becker suggested that perhaps I could write a short article on Orwell’s essay and circled the following sentence by Orville Schell:

Above all what is needed is to let the meaning choose the words, and not the other way around.

(Schell’s LATimes article, “Follies of Orthodoxy”, 11/4/07)

Schell’s advice was puzzling to me; so I looked into Orwell’s essay for help. Mr. Orwell stresses the need for clear, simple language that uses words evoking concrete images instead of relying on abstract, Latin-based terms that fail to convey clear meaning. If we take his advice, our primary aim (in any discourse) will be clarity of meaning; whenever practical, we will choose simple terms which convey concrete images, instead of plugging in some obscure jargon to do the work for us, i.e. not let the words ‘choose’ the meaning.
To illustrate his point, Orwell imagines a professor defending Soviet totalitarianism, who is reluctant to make the straight-forward assertion that Soviet policy allowed the “killing off your opponents when you can get a good result from doing so,” and chooses instead to make the long-winded, obfuscating statement:

While freely conceding that the Soviet regime exhibits certain features which the humanitarian may be inclined to deplore, we must, I think, agree that a certain curtailment of the rights to political opposition is an unavoidable concomitant of transitional periods, and that the rigors which the Russian people have been called upon to undergo have been amply justified in the sphere of concrete achievement.

(Orwell, 1946)

Not only is this pretentious and obscure, it also shows a speaker’s dishonesty and insincerity. As Orwell wrote,

The great enemy of clear language is insincerity. When there is a gap between one’s real and one’s declared aims, one turns to …long words and exhausted idioms, like a cuttlefish squirting ink.

(Orwell, 1946)
But this abuse of language often evolves into a more sinister use of language. As Orwell illustrated in various books, political propaganda routinely converts ‘war’ into ‘peace,’ and ‘peace’ into ‘war’; critics of government policy are branded as subversives and enemies of the state.
But it is not only in politics and defense of war policy that we use language routinely to twist the facts and transform falsehood into truth, and the converse. This happens too frequently in any discourse (spoken or written) in which ideology and value judgments play prominent roles; for example, discourse concerning economic systems, or governmental policies regulating individual activity, or issues like the right-to-life vs. right-to-choose, or those concerning the teaching of Darwinian evolution in the schools, or the separation of church and state, or the various issues regarding the opposition between religious and secular values.
In my field of philosophy, some people are very aware of the need for clarity and honesty in discourse, since a fair amount of philosophical literature has traditionally been written in complicated, sometimes very obscure language. Friedrich Nietzsche once wrote concerning a few German philosophers, “They muddy up the water to make it appear deep.” Unfortunately, large areas of philosophical writing, especially in areas of metaphysics, religious apologetics, and political thought, can be described as projects that “muddy the water” to make it appear deep.
There probably is no guarantee that we can completely avoid the abuse of language in politics and ideological debate or the sophistry of certain philosophical styles. But, we can heed Mr. Orwell’s advice and hopefully not fall too often into those ‘muddy, stagnant waters,’ which can choke off any meaningful dialogue. One way is give ourselves the discipline of a formal study or self-study course in critical thinking. In addition, extensive, critical reading of relevant works of history, philosophy (the clear kind), the sciences, and literature can also help.

No Conflict between Science and Religion?

From the Associated Press, March 3, 2009
* Vatican official calls atheist theories ‘absurd’
Cardinal Levada: No conflict between evolution science and faith in God
ROME – A Vatican cardinal said Tuesday that the Catholic Church does not stand in the way of scientific realities like evolution, though he described as “absurd” the atheist notion that evolution proves there is no God.
————-

Is Religious Faith compatible with the Evolutionary Sciences?

The good Cardinal Levada may be sure of his position (*See above), but there are reasons for questioning this popular view that science is compatible with religious faith. The view of “harmony between science and faith” can be restated in terms of the following claims:

• A significant number of scientists are also people of religious faith and belief in God.
• The sciences do not disprove God’s existence.
• Being a scientist and doing scientific work is consistent with believing in God.
• Naturalism is a philosophy that is incompatible with supernatural religion, but science is not committed to naturalism as a philosophy.
(This is part of the general view that science and religion are separate endeavors and have nothing to do with each other, e.g. Stephen J. Gould’s idea of science and religion comprising Separate Magisteria.)

Let’s consider these claims. First, the alleged compatibility based on the fact that many scientists are also believers in God results in a very weak sense of “compatibility.” As Jerry A. Coyne says, it’s much like saying that marriage is compatible with adultery because some married people practice adultery. Or like saying that being a Roman Catholic priest is compatible with paedophilia because a number of priests sexually abuse young people, or like saying that investment counselling is compatible with fraudulence because some counsellors turn out to be frauds. People, like Coyne or Richard Dawkins, who argue that science is not compatible with supernaturalism, are surely aware that some scientists cannot shake free of supernaturalism of some kind. What they argue is that a correct understanding of the scientific approach and knowledge implies a rejection of supernaturalism.

Second, the sciences are not in the business of proving or disproving God’s existence; but any look at the Western history — the rise of science and enlightenment thinking — reveals that the sciences have built (and continue to build) a strong case against any super-naturalistic view of nature, of history and society.

Third, it is a very weak argument to claim compatibility because scientists, like Kenneth Miller and Francis S. Collins, find belief in a god to be consistent with their scientific work. It might be true that neither evolutionary biology nor genetics proves there is no God; thus, belief in such an entity is not directly contradicted by knowledge gained in biology or a genetics. But it is also true that other scientists might hold bizarre beliefs consistent with their scientific work, e.g. some might find belief in ‘Voodoo arts’ to be consistent, some reincarnation, and some find that New Age Mysticism is consistent with their work as chemists. In short, the fact that a Miller or a Collins finds supernaturalism consistent with their science does nothing to show any compatibility between science proper and supernaturalism, unless we also admit a ‘compatibility’ with all forms of occultism, belief in magic or a variety of other bizarre beliefs.

Fourth, this relates to the distinction between naturalism as method and as philosophy, a distinction popularized by Eugenie Scott. As philosopher M. Pigliucci states it, rather than involving philosophical assumptions regarding the nature of reality, methodological naturalism is just a “provisional and pragmatic” position that scientists take in order to do their work. Unlike philosophical naturalism, the methodological type does not involve any denial of the supernatural possibility. Thus, we have scientists like Kenneth Miller pointing out that scientists do not take a vow of philosophical naturalism, but only commit themselves to the methodological kind. He tells us that all science requires is methodological naturalism, and that we “live in a material world,’ and use “the materials of nature to study the way nature works.” Hence, science is limited to “purely naturalistic explanations, because only those are testable, and only those have validity as science.” (From “The Reality Club,” comments on Jerry Coyne Essay, Seeing and Believing,” www.edge.org)

But according to Miller, such commitment does not commit the scientist to a philosophy (viz. naturalism) which denies the supernatural possibility. Thus, religious faith, Roman Catholicism in Miller’s case, is quite safe from erosion by the force of scientific knowledge.

Are people like Miller and Scott correct? Are the sciences correctly characterized as essentially naturalistic method, with no implication of a naturalistic philosophy?

The answer is a resounding “NO” according to a significant number of scientists, theoreticians of the sciences, and philosophers of science. Scientists like Richard Dawkins, Victor Stenger, Taner Edis and others have written books arguing the non-compatibility thesis. Philosophers like Daniel Dennett have also argued impressively against the compatibility claim. A recent article in “The New Republic” by evolutionary scientist, Jerry A. Coyne, (“Seeing and Believing,” February 04, 2009) presents interesting and telling arguments against compatibility. A materialistic explanation of nature, he tells us, is not a philosophical assumption of science but is an idea which has resulted from years of successful scientific research. In other words, the work of science supports the view that nature is to be explained in materialistic terms, completely devoid of reference to the supernatural. In short, the sciences and philosophical naturalism are more closely tied together than Miller and Scott suggest. Mario Bunge, in another recent article agrees [See his “The philosophy behind pseudoscience", Skeptical Inquirer 30 (4) 29-27 (2006)]. He tells us that every intellectual endeavor, including science, has an underlying philosophy. He states that “the philosophy behind evolutionary biology is naturalism (or materialism) together with epistemological realism.” He adds that “by contrast, the philosophy behind creationism (whether traditional or “scientific”) is supernaturalism (the oldest variety of idealism).”

Given the arguments advanced by these people, the idea that science can be characterized as pure methodology, devoid of naturalistic philosophy, is very questionable. Even Miller, when he argues the case of natural selection against so-called “intelligent design,” does not take evolutionary biology to be pure method. He cites the well-grounded theory and body of knowledge established by the science to make his case against the “Intelligent Design” proponents. But he stops there; he does not use the same biological findings to raise question regarding Christian theism. However, his work and arguments contra creationism and Intelligent Design demonstrate that he really does not limit himself, as a scientist, to method. Granted, we can make the philosophical distinction between method and philosophy; but ultimately this distinction doesn’t do much in the debate between naturalists and super-naturalists, other than offer some psychological comfort to the super-naturalist.

In conclusion, the touted distinction between methodological and philosophical naturalism does little to show that science and religion are compatible. The same can be said regarding the claims that “science does not disprove God,” that many scientists are also persons of faith and find belief in God compatible with their work in the sciences. None of these makes much headway in showing that the sciences are compatible with a commitment to a supernatural view of reality.

Aren’t Agnostics Different from Atheists?

An intellectual combatant once denigrated his opponent by claiming that the opponent did not even differentiate between atheism and agnosticism. Prima facie, this distinction is obvious; even a fifth grader can understand it. However, the opponent might have downplayed the differences only to focus attention on the similarities between atheistic and agnostic views.

Concerning the “difference” between atheism and agnosticism

Most people recognize the difference between the atheistic and agnostic position. Atheism, they point out, denies the existence of any deity. On the other hand, agnosticism only denies knowledge of a god’s existence, allowing for the possibility that a god might exist.

Accordingly, the agnostic is supposed to “leave open the possibility of a god’s existence; whereas the atheist allegedly shuts the door on that possibility (* See note below). We could imagine the agnostic saying something like this: “We don’t have knowledge of a god, but there could be one. Who knows?” And imagine also the atheist making the strong (loud?) assertion that “there is no god!” On this view, the agnostic is seen as a tentative, uncommitted nonbeliever, a “fence-sitter” (someone who cannot decide until he sees which the way “metaphysical winds” blow); whereas the atheist is depicted as intransigent (even dogmatic?) in his declaration that there is no god.

This is the conventional, man-in-the-street-view of atheism and agnosticism. This is fine for people anxious to get on with the business of living and impatient with nitpicking, philosophical distinctions. But this common-sense picture tends to ignore the important similarities between the atheism and agnosticism. Moreover, the conventional view can result in the type of caricatures noted above.

I shall emphasize the similarity, rather than the difference, between the two “non-believer” positions. Admittedly there are some people who call themselves “agnostic” but retain their belief in a god. A more accurate designation for that view would be “fideist,” or the view that recognizes humans’ lack knowledge but retains faith in a deity. However, the more common form of agnosticism implies a lack of belief in a deity. Like atheism, it rejects belief in a deity. The agnostic philosophy is “a-theistic” insofar as it omits deity. Like atheism, this form of agnosticism expresses a secular approach (to life) devoid of deity.

In this context you will find some people arguing that the correct use of the term “atheist” is to denote a philosophical perspective which is devoid of deity, i.e., “a-theistic” inasmuch as it excludes belief in a god. The argument, then, is that “a-theism,” taken in this sense, does not logically entail the metaphysical, categorical declaration that there is no God. The debate would then focus on the correct meaning of “atheist” and “atheism.” (“Positive atheism” denies existence of deity; “negative atheism” proceeds without reference to deity.)

For now let us bypass this debate over the semantics of “atheism.” We can admit that ordinarily the term “atheist” connotes the denial that a god exists. In this regard the conventional view does not mislead us. (Atheists tend to deny the reality of a deity; agnostics simply omit belief in such ‘reality.’) But let us set aside for now the distinction between the atheistic and the agnostic views. Instead, let us focus on the similarity between them.

Dismiss the notion that the agnostic is really just an uncommitted, “fence-sitter.” Surely many agnostics are not. For such people, agnosticism does not imply a tentative, uncommitted position. Instead it connotes a strong commitment to rationality and the “ethics of inquiry.” Here imagine the agnostic applying W. K. Clifford’s ethical principle that we’re not to believe anything unless we have adequate evidence to support the belief. Accordingly, many agnostics reject belief in a god as neither a rationally nor an ethically justifiable position. This certainly is not the view of a tentative, “fence-sitter.”

Agnostics emphasize belief in a supernatural being is outside the scope of human knowledge, and point out that nobody has ever provided adequate, objective grounds for such belief. In other words, our agnostic doesn’t simply deny knowledge of the existence of a deity. He denies that we have any rational grounds to support belief in a deity. Some agnostics will even say that, with respect to specific “gods” (e.g., the God of Judeo-Christianity) their position is “atheistic” in the strong sense. No such ‘god’ ever existed. Agnostics tend to agree with atheists that all talk of the supernatural and deity is vague, and that the proposition that God exists is far from clear, but even when relatively clear, it is by and large a groundless proposition.

What about the atheist? Well, if he is a rational individual, he does not simply issue the loud declaration: “There is no god.” On the contrary, he will point out that (despite centuries of theologies and apologetics) we lack knowledge of any deity nor anything remotely close to rational grounds for belief in a deity. He might also question the meaning and coherence of propositions which assert that a deity exists and has specifiable properties.

Here the atheist is in full agreement with the agnostic. Both take the rationally-based position which denies any grounds for deity. Their difference seems to be one of emphasis, with one emphasizing that there is no deity because there are no rational grounds for a deity, and the other emphasizing our utter lack of knowledge and compelling evidence for a deity’s existence, and proceeding as if there were none. For all practical purposes, the agnostic “rejects” deity in much the same way as the atheist. He simply is not as emphatic in expressing his rejection.
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(Footnote)
* In this connection, consider the phrase “possibility of god’s existence.” On the conventional view, the atheist supposedly denies the possibility of god’s existence; whereas the agnostic leaves the door open on this possibility. (Philosophers who defend Christian theism make much of this alleged “possibility of God’s existence.” Likewise, those who argue that science and empirical inquiry cannot disprove the existence of God, also emphasize this notion of the possibility of God’s existence.)

Formalists emphasize possibility as logical possibility. Here ‘the possibility of X’ means ‘X does not entail a contradiction.’ So the possibility of god’s existence means that the proposition ‘god exists’ does not entail a contradiction.

Some philosophers characterize logical possibility in terms of the concept of possible worlds. Here the proposition ‘Possibly X exists’ is translated as ‘There is a possible world, call it “Tangerine” in which X exists,’ without implying that possible world “Tangerine” is the actual world.

But as Daniel Dennett points out (See his Darwin’s Dangerous Idea) there are other kinds of possibilities. We can speak of something being physically possible (or impossible); or biologically possible (or impossible). It is physically impossible that I high jump (without assistance) a twenty-foot high barrier, although it is logically possible (no self contradiction). A biologist will tell us that it is biologically impossible for a virgin to give birth, although the proposition asserting a virgin birth is not a logical contradiction.

Defenders of the theistic view often demand that critics of belief in a deity prove that the existence of such a deity is impossible. Some say that critics have to disprove G’s existence. Obviously, this demands an awful lot. But to even understand their requirement, one should clarify the type of impossibility at issue here. Is it logical impossibility? Then one would have to show that the ‘god-exists’ proposition entails a contradiction. Is the possibility at issue a physical possibility? Probably not, since the deity is supposed to be a spiritual being. The physical possibility would have to apply to the alleged interaction between this spiritual being and the human, material world. Here the skeptic would have a more manageable task, arguing that such interaction is physically impossible.

From the other direction, the theists might be encouraged to find that the skeptic has not proven the impossibility of his god’s existence. But this merely implies that the theist can claim nothing beyond the logical possibility of his god’s existence, which is not a very secure ground on which to stand.

Contrary to philosophers who focus on the issue of possibility or impossibility of deity, scientifically-based writers (including certain philosophers) prefer to state the problem (of existence of deity) in terms the strength or weakness of the case that one can make for existence of a deity. What rational grounds or empirical evidence can be connected (in some way) to the claim that a deity is real? Here the scientific-based skeptic finds that the defenders of theism have not even managed a weak case in support of their “god’s” existence.

More chewing on the bone of “truth”

“The truth” does not refer to an entity that exists and can be found. But often people speak this way: “The truth is out there. All we have to do is to look for it.”

“The truth” by itself is vague and not very meaningful; it has to be completed by what that truth is about; e.g. the truth about human existence, or the truth about Church history, etc. (…and even then it remains problematic and vague.)

The search for truth, in a philosophical context, might mean the attempt to learn the significance and ultimate character of human existence. Other times, it may mean the attempt to identify those values that define human excellence and the good life. As such, the “search for truth” is value-laden, and the term “truth” is a value term (much like “good” or “sacred”).

A great paradox here is that in those important areas of human concern —viz, religion, morality, politics, history, social thought, etc.— the concept of `truth’ is a very problematic concept. It easily becomes confused (and “infused”) with factors of value judgment and (political and religious) ideological bias.
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Typically in the modern age most professional philosophers do not claim to possess “truth” in the sense of wisdom, moral and religious truth, and certainly do not attempt to teach others the road to that truth. The role of the person of wisdom who points others toward truth and the higher good has been claimed by religionists and advocates of popular moral-ethical-political ideologies.
The typical intellectual and scholar would be painfully uncomfortable wearing the “robes of the wise man”; on the other hand, preachers, politicians and even “show biz” celebrities will frequently and comfortably don the robes of wisdom and moral authority.
Subsequently, many rationalists and critical philosophers look with great suspicion and skepticism on anyone claiming to teach wisdom and higher truth.
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The “higher truth” is that there is no higher truth. There are only the “human-level” truths that human beings discover, learn and articulate in propositional form.

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“Tell me the truth.” She cried, “Where were you last night?”
How could he answer her, since he didn’t have the foggiest …”

He could answer that he was practicing philosophy. That would throw her for a loss.

“Does he expect me to believe that story? might be her reaction. “Whoever heard of spending the night practicing philosophy?”

In this case, to tell the truth is simply to give an honest, factual account of your doings and whereabouts during the period in question. Nothing here should be perplexing; we all know what “truth” means.

“There’s no mystery as to where I was; I had to work overtime last night.”

There also is no mystery in this use of the phrase: “to tell the truth”; it simply means to speak truthfully to the best of one’s ability, to relate the facts.
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“Search for truth” is more problematic; as is the phrase “to teach the truth.” Often use of the substantive (on noun) “truth” or “the truth” is problematic, or at least misleading. Use of the adjective “true” and the adverb “truly” or “truthfully” are less problematic.

The proposition that the truth is out there somewhere, and that if we look, we shall find it can be correctly used in the proper context. (For example, as when we don’t know what happened but we’re sure there are ways of learning what happened.) But talk of “the truth being out there” often leads to a misconception.

Often our use of the noun “truth” suggests to people that there’s something called ‘truth’ existing “out there somewhere.” The only thing that is “out there” for us to discover and observe is the world of things, persons, animals, and happenings. (But even with respect to these, some will engage in philosophical debate.)
[Adding to the confusion, people sometimes equate “the Truth” to “God.”]

If the label “truth” does not apply to an entity, what does it apply to? [This is a misleading question and reflects a type of philosophical confusion.]

Maybe we should simply replace every sentence using the term “truth” by one that omits that noun. “He told the truth” is simply another way of saying that “he spoke truthfully” or “he made true assertions.” “We’re trying to learn the truth about this matter” is another way of saying that “we trying to learn what happened or is happening.”

Another thought: In many contexts the label “truth” is often simply a way of commending someone’s assertion, affirmation, statement, claim, etc.. Applying the label does not imply that someone has apprehended part of a mysterious entity called ‘the truth.’ We’re merely acknowledging that he got it right, that he hit the target. It is much like a gold star pasted to a student’s test or essay.

“True” makes sense only in contrast to “false”; and both are modifiers of nouns: reports, stories, propositions, explanations, theories. A report is true when it accurately reports the event in question. It is false when it fails to report the event accurately.

When I witness an event and can report accurately what happened, then my statements regarding describing the event are likely true. When I lack knowledge of what happened and purport to report it anyway, most likely my statements will be false. To say I speak the truth or fail to express the truth is simply another way of stating that I reported things accurately or inaccurately.

In some cases, my claim to speak the truth invites the question as to how I gained the knowledge at issue. In many cases, a valid claim to truth and knowledge go together. Yet we must allow for the occasion when a person makes a truthful statement without possessing the relevant knowledge. (e.g., He made a lucky guess, but surely could not have known.)

The concept of knowledge, understood as propositional knowledge (knowledge that ..), presupposes the concepts of truth and falsehood. I know that DC is snowbound when my belief that DC is snowbound is true and I have good reasons for that belief. My belief that ‘DC is snowbound’ is true makes sense only by contrast to the possibility that it (that belief) could be false.

Does God’s Omniscience Eliminate Human Freedom?

[polldaddy poll=2696408]

To assume simply that we can transfer our ordinary language and concepts to a transcendental setting and use them much the same way as we ordinarily use them is at the very least a questionable assumption, betraying a fundamental confusion.

Does God’s Omniscience Imply Lack of Human Freedom?

Suppose there exists an omniscient being (“God”?) who has complete fore-knowledge of all events. This seems logically to imply that no act can possibly be free. For the claim that we acted freely implies that we could have done otherwise, e.g. I attended mass on Sunday morning, but I could have chosen to play golf instead. However, if an omniscient being knew that I would go to mass, than the proposition that ‘I attend mass on Sunday’ is true. On Sunday morning I could not have acted so as to nullify the knowledge possessed by the omniscient being; i.e., I could not act so as to falsify the proposition ‘I attend mass on Sunday.’ Thus, I was not free to do other than what I in fact did. Freedom of action is nothing but a delusion.

This line of argumentation is suspect, to say the least. One way of showing this involves an analogy between our actions as viewed by an omniscient being and the actions of a character in a novel discussed by observers outside the novel.

God’s eye-view of a completed script:

When we ‘view’ things from the perspective of an omniscient being, we imagine an individual’s life-line as already completed. The future is as fixed as the past, and nothing can alter it. (God’s complete foreknowledge has fixed the script that we must follow. For all eternity is was true that I would attend mass on Sunday morning.) Every action on that life-line is fixed, and there’s nothing that the human agent can do to change any part of it. What appear to be open options in the future (mass or golf on Sunday morning?) are already closed (definitely mass!).
By analogy, suppose that there’s a completed script (a novel) that describes a character’s entire existence. Then imagine that we survey the entire story from the outside (God’s eye-view) and see where everything is going. Everything is fully determined. The character-within-the-story plays out his role according to the script, which is final and closed. Consider an example of a small part of the script:
The main character in our story, call him “John,” learns that his employer is commiting fraudulent acts to gain rich government contracts. Now John faces a hard choice. He can either ignore the cheating by his employer, that is, go along quietly and keep his well-paying job; or he can blow the whistle on his employer and face the consequences (likely lose his job, lose the friendship of his co-workers, even be blackballed in the industry so that finding another position would be difficult). After much agonizing and soul searching, John decides to report the fraudulence to the proper authorities. As a result, he loses his job and incurs economic hardships. He is unemployed for a long period and his wife is forced to take a low-paying job herself so they can pay their bills. They lose their house and the marriage suffers. The marriage endures and he enjoys partial, financial recovery, but he definitely loses out in terms of economic and social status. Years later, looking back on his fateful decision to “blow the whistle,” John does not regret his decision. Yes, he paid a heavy price, but he feels he made the right choice and kept his moral integrity intact.

Descent into a Philosophical Confusion:

Now we ask, did John act freely or not? Was he in control of his action and thus responsible for his action? It is clear to me that, when we consider these questions within the context of the story —- the questions make sense and we can coherently debate the answer. We might argue that John did act freely. He chose to blow the whistle on his employer; he was not forced or coerced to act as he did. He knew what he was doing, was in full control of what he did; and most certainly knew that his action would have consequences, maybe negative repercussions. The confusion comes into play when we ask the same questions and attempt to answer them from a perspective outside the story —- as external observers who know how the story turns out. Here the questions do not make any sense. What could we possibly be asking? Whether John, a fictional character, could have diverted from the script as it was been written? Surely this is absurd. From this external perspective it is obvious that the fictional character, John, is defined (all his actions fully determined) by the script as the author has written it. Someone might say that “John” has no ‘choice’ in the matter; that he is a mere puppet fully controlled by someone (author ?) working the strings. But surely these are trivial points and suggest great confusion. From an external perspective, the concepts of ‘freedom,’ ‘being in control,’ and ‘responsibility’ do not even apply..
How could these questions (regarding freedom, control, & responsibility) asked from an external perspective even make any sense? Isn’t it obvious that the concepts of freedom (and lack of), in-control (and out-of-control), and responsibility (no responsibility) get their proper application within the context of the story? From the external perspective, there is no point in asking whether the character “John” could have diverted from the story-line and done otherwise. Only someone terribly confused or simply joking around would even pose such a question. Given our external perspective, we know that the character acts as the script has him acting. But this does negate the possibility, that within the story John could have acted freely. He deliberated and chose the blow the whistle on his employer. In our example, he did have freedom of choice and acted accordingly. That’s why he agonized so much over his choice.
When we ask whether human freedom is compatible with an omniscient being having complete foreknowledge of everything we do, we commit the fallacy of taking things from a god’s-eye-view perspective and assuming that we can unproblematically apply the language of freedom. It is the same confusion shown when someone asks whether a character in a novel could have diverted from the story line laid out by the author? At best, it is a philosophical joke, maybe instructive to a point. At worst, it betrays an astonishing level of confusion and lack of critical thought