Author Archives: jbernal

US Citizenship and a History of Racial Discrimination

by Juan Bernal

In August 2012 just before the Republican Convention Mitt Romney, campaigning in his home state of Michigan, remarked on how proud he was to be a native son of that great state and then made the off-hand remark that “nobody had to ask about his birth certificate.”  Romney apparently thinks that he gets credit for being born in the USA (actually an accident of fate, as he could have been born elsewhere, e.g. Bangladesh) and was obviously flirting with those great Americans known as the “birthers,” those people of average(?) intellect who don’t think that President Barack Obama is a citizen of the USA.

Yes, Romney is willing to cater to those people who make the completely preposterous charge that President Obama is not an American and the comical claims that his birth certificate is fraudulent.  Supposedly these people — the “birthers” — are convinced that Obama was not born in the USA, but born outside in some other part of the world (Kenya?).  I’m not sure whether these people also deny that Obama’s mother was a citizen, but if they don’t, then all suspicions as to place of his birth are irrelevant, since any child born to a US citizen is automatically a citizen regardless of the place of birth.  Or maybe that they don’t realize that any person born in Hawaii after 1900 is automatically a citizen.

Who knows what the birthers think?  Do they think that Hawaii is not part of the US?  Do they think that if the father is a non-citizen, the child is a non-citizen also? (At one time this was actually true.) I’m not sure they know what they think.

At any rate, all this nonsense about Obama’s citizenship set me thinking other things about US citizenship, the different ways in which people come to be citizens of this great country, and other facts about our country’s handling of issues regarding citizenship and naturalization, and the extent to which  racial and ethnic discrimination has affected the process. .

Different Paths to Citizenship

Given that most citizens were born in this country and had parents who were citizens, some people might mistakenly think that being native or born to US parents are the only paths to US citizenship.  But there are many ways in which people can become citizens.  So I listed some of them and made a few comments about some of these categories.

(Comments are footnoted at end preceded by the pound sign ‘#’.)

First the ones with which most people are familiar. People gain citizenship by:

  • Birth in USA to parents who are citizens.
  • Birth in USA to at least one parent who is a citizen.
  • Birth in USA and parents are not citizens.
  • Born of at least one parent who is citizen, regardless of place of birth.
  • Immigration to the USA and Naturalization as citizen.

Next, ones which most people don’t know too well:

  1. Africans who were brought here as slaves and made citizens when freed           (See #1 below.)
  1. Native Americans who choose to live outside a reservation and become citizens.(See #2 below.)
  1. Valuable aliens (e.g., German scientists & engineers, runway models!) brought to our country and given a quick path to citizenship.
  2.  Non-citizen military veterans who were given fast track to naturalization.
  3.  War-brides Act of 1945 allowed alien wives brought home by veterans to be    naturalized and led to the practice of naturalization by marriage.
  4.  Residents of territory that were purchased or claimed by the United States.   (See #3 and #4 below)

(See the unjust case of the act which rescinded Filipino US citizenship. )

  1.  Residents of territory which became part of USA as a result of defeat in war.  (See #5 below)
  1. Residents of territory that entered the union in the 19th and 20th centuries States.     (See #6 below)

Racial and Ethnic Considerations 

Although the USA has given entry to millions of immigrants and opened the doors to eventual naturalization, showing that US citizenship is a prize that many people rightly desire and value, some historical facts about conditions for US citizenship, Acts of Congress on citizenship, and quotas on immigration reflect the racism and ethnocentrism of the past.

Consider some of these:

The Constitution does not mandate race-neutral naturalization.

The Naturalization Act of 1795  set the initial parameters on naturalization: “free, White persons” who had been resident for five years or more.  (In effect, this barred the door to citizenship for the Native Americans who had been ‘residents’ for centuries.)

Until 1952, the Naturalization Acts written by Congress still allowed only white persons to become naturalized as citizens (except for two years in the 1870s which the Supreme Court declared to be a mistake).

The Naturalization Act of 1798, part of the Alien and Sedition Acts, was passed by the Federalists and extended the residency requirement from five to fourteen years. It specifically targeted Irish and French immigrants who were involved in Democratic-Republican Party politics. It was repealed in 1802.

A special Amendment to the Constitution, the Fourteenth Amendment (1868), was needed to grant citizenship to newly freed black people, all of whom had resided in the USA for many years.

The enabling legislation for the naturalization aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment was the Naturalization Act of 1870 , which allowed naturalization of “aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent”, but is silent about other races.

Even after this event, many decades passed while the rights and privileges of citizenship were denied to blacks in most southern states, and even in some northern states.

Passage of the Fourteenth Amendment meant that, in theory, all persons born in the U.S., and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens regardless of race.

Citizenship by birth in the United States, however, was not initially granted to Asians until 1898, when the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did apply to Asians born in the United States in United States v. Wong Kim Ark.

The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act  banned Chinese workers and specifically barred them from naturalization. The Immigration Act of 1917, (Barred Zone Act) extended those restrictions to almost all Asians.

The 1922 Cable Act  specified that women marrying aliens ineligible for naturalization lose their US citizenship. At the time, all Asians were ineligible for naturalization.

The Immigration Act of 1924  barred entry of all those ineligible for naturalization, which again meant non-Filipino Asians.

It took until 1924 for Congress to get around to passing the Indian Citizenship Act, which made citizens of all Native Americans, who were not already citizens, born in the United States.

Following the Spanish American War in 1898, Philippine  residents were classified as US nationals. But the 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act, or Philippine Independence Act, reclassified Filipinos as aliens, and set a quota of 50 immigrants per year, and otherwise applying the Immigration Act of 1924 to them.

Asians were first permitted naturalization by the 1943 Magnuson Act, which repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act. India  and the Philippines were allowed 100 annual immigrants under the 1946 Filipino Naturalization Act.

The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (better known as the McCarran-Walter Act) lifted racial restrictions, but kept the quotas in place.

The Immigration Act of 1965 finally allowed Asians and all persons from all nations be given equal access to immigration and naturalization.  (It was about time that this happen!)

Closing Thoughts

Our government has unquestionably discriminated against people of color (Blacks, Latinos), Native Americans, and Asians with respect to immigration and qualification for naturalization.  These people have been denied entry altogether or forced to wait for decades to enjoy the same privileges that members of other more-desirable groups enjoy.  To give a stark contrast, while blacks were denied the full rights of citizenship for many decades, Native Americans ignored,  and Asian people simply blocked from entry,  the white southerners who betrayed the US and actively fought a war against the USA as soldiers of an alien state (the Confederate States) were immediately re-instated as full-fledged citizens of the USA following the end of the Civil War in 1865.

Talk about a stark, unjustifiable difference in the treatment of people!

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#1, African people forcibly brought to our great land to serve as slaves for those who could afford to buy slaves.  There wasn’t any question as to their status prior to the Emancipation Proclamation signed by Lincoln in the 1860s: they were property, not persons with right  to citizenship.  The Proclamation freed them from slavery, but the 14th Amendment was needed to give them status as citizens.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was adopted July 9, 1868, as one of the Rconstruction Amendments.  Its Citizenship clause gives a broad definition of citizenship that overruled Dred Scott v. Sandford (1856) that had held that black people could not be citizens of the United States.

Section 1 reads: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

#2: Native Americans or members of the many native, ‘indian’cultures that had a long history in north America prior to the Europeans.  Would they be allowed entry into citizenship or not?  Prior to 1924 there were acts of Congress granting citizenship to specific groups (e.g. Cherokee, Choctaw); and later individual Native Americans could become naturalized, as if they were from a foreign country.

On June 2, 1924  President Calvin Coolidge signed the Indian Citizenship Act,  which made citizens of all Native Americans, who were not already citizens, born in the United States and its territories. Prior to passage of the act, nearly two-thirds of Native Americans were already U.S. citizens.

American Indians today in the U.S. have all the rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can vote in elections, and run for political office.

 #3 Citizens of a country that is appropriated as US territory.  Start with the Philippines:

Following the Spanish American War in 1898, Philippine residents were classified as US nationals. But

the 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act, or Philippine Independence Act, reclassified Filipinos as aliens, and set a quota of 50 immigrants per year, otherwise applying the Immigation Act of 1924 to them. The quotas did not apply to Filipinos who served in the US Navy.

#4 Other examples of US Congress manipulation of citizenship conditions:

All persons born in Puerto Rico between April 11, 1899, and January 12, 1941, are automatically conferred citizenship as of the date the law was signed by the President Truman on June 27, 1952. Additionally, all persons born in Puerto Rico on or after January 13, 1941, ar native-born citizens of the United States. Note that because of when the law was passed, for some, the native-born status was retroactive.

All persons born in the U.S. Virgin Islands on or after February 25, 1927, are native-born citizens of the United States.  All the persons and their children born in the U.S. Virgin Islands subsequent to January 17, 1917, and prior to February 25, 1927, are declared to be citizens of the United States as of February 25, 1927 if complied with the U.S. law dispositions.

All persons born in Alaska on or after June 2, 1924, are native-born citizens of the United States. Alaska was declared a US State  on January 3, 1959.

All persons born in Hawaii on or after April 30, 1900, are native-born citizens of the United States. Hawaii was declared a U.S. State on August 21, 1959.

All persons born in the island of Guam on or after April 11, 1899 (whether before or after August 1, 1950) subject to the jurisdiction of the US, are declared citizens of the United States.

#5  Residents of territory which became part of USA as a result of defeat in war.  In the Mexican-American war of 1846, two examples would be residents of territories that later became California and New Mexico.  These former Mexican citizens who chose to remain in the conquered territory automatically became US residents and later, when the territory was admitted to the union, they automatically became US citizens.

#6  Residents of territory that entered the union in the 19th and 20th centuries.  One such example is New Mexico, which became a US territory when Mexico was defeated in the Mexican-American War of 1846.  The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, signed in 1848,  included Article VIII which guaranteed that Mexicans who remained more than one year in the ceded lands would automatically become full-fledged United States citizens (or they could declare their intention of remaining Mexican citizens); however, the Senate modified Article IX, changing the first paragraph and excluding the last two. Among the changes was that Mexican citizens would “be admitted at the proper time (to be judged of by the Congress of the United States).  The “proper time” was delayed until 1912 when New Mexico was finally admitted to the union.

[ My paternal grandparents, who were New Mexican residents in 1912, became citizens of the US as a result of New Mexico’s entry into the union. ]

 

A Strange Philosophical Objection to the Work of Simon Weisenthal

Juan Bernal

The Holocaust began with Hitler’s rise to power in January of 1933 and ended on VE Day (May 8, 1945). During this time, more than 6 million Jews and millions of other groups that caught the negative attention of Nazi Germany. While all the murders were devastating to native populations, none were so devastating than that of the Jews. During this period, 5,000 Jewish communities were wiped out and the total that died represented 1/3 of all Jewish people alive at that time.

 

The Nazi-hunting Simon Wiesenthal Centre said it has provided “new evidence” to authorities in Budapest on its most wanted suspect Laszlo Csatary, believed to be living in Hungary. The centre’s Efraim Zuroff, pictured in 2009, “last week submitted new evidence to the prosecutor in Budapest regarding crimes committed during World War II by its No 1 Most Wanted suspect Laszlo Csatary,” it said. (AFP Photo/Mark Ralston)The Nazi-hunting Simon Wiesenthal Centre confirmed Sunday that Laszlo Csatary, accused of complicity in the killings of 15,700 Jews, had been tracked down to the Hungarian capital.  (Press Release, July, 2012)

 The Setting for a Surprising Philosophical Objection:

It is cases like that of Laszlo Csatary, another pathetic example of a human being who likely actively participated in the Nazi wholesale torture and killing of innocent civilians (children, women, old men) during the Nazi period (1930-1945) in twentieth century Europe, that I had in mind some years ago when I praised the work of Simon Weisenthal.

Simon Wiesenthal, a survivor of the Nazi death camps, dedicated his life to documenting the crimes of the Holocaust and to hunting down the perpetrators still at large. “When history looks back,” Wiesenthal explained, “I want people to know the Nazis weren’t able to kill millions of people and get away with it.” His work stands as a reminder and a warning for future generations.

But my philosophy correspondent, Pablo, was not impressed.  “That immoral!” he declared.

“What’s immoral,” I asked?  I thought he meant that the past actions of the old Nazi were immoral.   But, what he meant was that the actions of Simon Weisenthal were immoral.  It turned out that Pablo’s consistent utilitarian judgment told him that those old Nazi were not doing society any harm any more, so going after them was immoral.

“ Leave them alone; they’re just old, harmless men now!  Who cares what they did in the past?”  seemed to be Pablo’s  attitude.

After I recovered from my astonishment, it became clear that Pablo had some reasons (‘philosophical’ reasons) for taking exception to the morality of the work of Simon Weisenthal and others like him who continue to ‘hunt’ old Nazis who escaped justice back in the 1940s as WWII was ending.

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Three reasons given for opposing the prosecution of old Nazi and my responses.

1 -  It is just vengeance or retribution – the old Biblical “eye or an eye” type of thinking which an enlightened society should no longer practice.

Pablo,  argued along these lines:

 “Under Utilitarianism, the purpose of punishment is to rehabilitate those who have committed crimes (and there is little doubt that many of these war ‘criminals’ who escaped to S. America and elsewhere were really criminals). If rehabilitation is the proper goal, then of what purpose is it to punish some one in his 60s or 70s who has led a decent life in his new country? The only purpose for such punishment is purely retributive; the kind of deontological thinking we find in Xtianity and Judaism (and, I suspect, in Islam as well). That’s the old ‘eye for an eye’ thinking about which I will have none of. What’s pathetic is that Juan wants to go along with this ancient retributive thinking. . . Punishment should be metted out only when it can do some good toward rehabilitation or to protect society from criminals who can’t be rehabilitated.”

This is a surprising assertion, since there are ethical and legal retributive theories which are not at all mere expression of the ancient Biblical practice of vengeance and theories which give philosophical grounds for punishment and sanctions whose aim is not to rehabilitate the offender or to “protect society from criminals who cannot be rehabilitated.”  For example, Joel Feinberg writes that  “punishment is a standard vehicle for the expression of resentment of injury received and also .. for the expression of recognition and disapproval of evil.”  (Doing and Deserving, Joel Feinberg)

From other philosophers and legal theorists, we get other statements of punishment as the expression of the community include the “moral condemnation of the whole community,” [1] “the emphatic denunciation by the community of a crime,” [2] “the expression of censure,” [3] and “communal expression of disapproval.” [4]

In short, the idea of punishment as retribution is not equivalent (in any sense) to the old Biblical notion of an “eye for an eye” type of vengeance.  Punishment as retribution can serve as the community’s expression of an emphatic condemnation of certain types of criminal acts, such as the mass killing of innocents.  Nor is there general agreement among philosophers and legal theorists that punishment is justified only when the offender can be rehabilitated or when society must be protected from that offender who cannot be rehabilitated.  Our thinking (legal and moral thinking) does not limit legitimate punishment to cases in which the offender can be rehabilitated.

But the general point concerns our laws and sanctions: Our laws impose penalties for violations of those laws.  The primary purpose of these laws and sanctions is to protect society, not to reform or rehabilitate the offender.

These laws with their sanctions can also be seen as expressing society’s legal and moral commitment.  They say: “We hold the protection and security of people – especially the young and the vulnerable – to be so important that we as a society will impose the appropriate penalty on violators of those laws.”  The laws with their sanctions for violations of those laws express the legal and moral commitment of the community.

Legally, the only relevant question about the appropriateness of the penalty: Did the accused commit the offense?

Morally, a community has the right to bring such violators to justice. This can be seen as an expression of the collective judgment of the community.  With respect to range of gross violations, the penalty can be seen as the community’s condemnation of such action.   We have a collective and emphatic declaration that you will not do ‘S’; but that if you do S you will be hunted down and punished to the fullest extent of the law.  If you do S, you incur a debt to society (primarily to the victims and their families) which you are obligated to repay.

In summary, a retributive theory of justice and punishment merely implies that the offender shall be held accountable for his actions and shall be brought to justice, regardless of any utilitarian concern with his rehabilitation or re-education.  If these can be accomplished, that’s fine.  But the application of justice does not rest on that utilitarian value. A retributive theory of justice and punishment does not at all takes us back to the “ancient Biblical practice” of a violent extraction of an “eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.”  

2 – There is no social benefit gained from the “hunting of Nazis.”  In many cases the old Nazi is just a harmless old man who might even be a benefit to the society in which he resides.  Going after him absolutely does not do anybody any good.

Here we have another surprising claim from my correspondent, Pablo.

His idea of the Utilitarian view of arrest & trial long after the offence (only when the offender can be rehabilitated or the action can be seen as protecting society) is a very narrow version of Utilitarianism.  A Rule Utilitarianism can justify laws calling for such arrest and trial of old criminals as laws that society implements for the good of society, e.g., as a way of discouraging and deterring other likely offenders. What is justified on utilitarian grounds is the law with sanctions or general rule that holds an offender responsible for this offense, and not the specific acts of seeking out, arresting and bringing to trial old offenders.  There is absolutely no inconsistency between Utilitarianism in this broader sense and the act of prosecuting old Nazis who have gotten away with their crimes against humanity (done in the 1940s in Nazi Europe).   And there are no grounds for claiming that “there is no social benefit” gotten from searching out and bringing to trial those old Nazis.

3 – The old Nazi is no longer the same person he was when he participated in the Nazi program to exterminate human beings, and should not be punished for what that “other person” did in the past.

Here’s another astounding claim by Pablo.  He writes:

“One of the most important aspects of selfhood, perhaps the most important, are the changes in the brain which are reflected  in memory loss, especially long-term memory. Without those memories, beliefs and  values we once held, we are no longer the same person. This is one of the reasons I suggested to Juan, regarding the prosecution of old war criminals, that the latter may not even be the same person they were 60 years earlier. Thus, since their selves have changed, they may not be the same person at all. Defining the self on a purely genetic basis only, just won’t do.”

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Here Pablo argues that we should not punish old Nazis because they’re no longer the same person who actively took part in the holocaust of the ’40s.  On this reasoning, there isn’t anyone guilty of a crime who should stand trial for this criminal acts, because — as contemporary science tells us (at least on Pablo’s reading) — they are no longer the same person who acted in the past.  Yes, folks, this is where some peoples’ version of philosophy takes them!

Surely, the fact that I have changed in many ways from the person I was in the past (no longer have the same beliefs, values have changed, don’t retain some memory, and so on) does not absolve me of responsibility for what I did in the past.  If I did something good, I can still claim credit (Hey, its been over thirty years since I earned that Ph.D and I still claim credit for it!) ; If I did something bad (Yes, twenty years ago I cheated my partner out of his fair share of the profit; I am still responsible for that shameful act!) , I am still responsible.  Claiming that I have changed as a person won’t do as a reason for concluding that I’m no longer responsible.  The only cases in which the law and our conventional practices allow for this absolution is in the case of insanity, brain injury or acts prior to maturity, as when something I did as an adolescent no longer counts against me as an adult.  But, not so in the case of past actions of an adult under normal circumstances.

Persons are creatures who retain an identity through change.   Sometimes those changes are so drastic that we are inclined to say that he/she is no longer the same person, as in the case of brain injury or serious stroke, for example.  But just because we change in some ordinary ways as we get older does not justify claiming that we’re no longer the same person who committed a crime decades earlier and disclaiming responsibility for what we did.  That the criminal is no longer the “same person” sounds too much like the ploy used by defense lawyers to soften the charges against their client.  And using this “lawyer’s tactic” to excuse the old Nazi who got away will not do, either legally or morally.

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Simon Weisenthal’s Explanation  

But let’s set aside these ‘philosophical’ considerations because the best explanation was given by Mr. Weisenthal himself.  In response to the question -  Why do the Nazi hunters pursue these old, fugitive Nazis long after their crimes?

 

“Wiesenthal was often asked to explain his motives for becoming a Nazi hunter.  According to Clyde Farnsworth in the New York Times Magazine (February 2, 1964), Wiesenthal once spent the Sabbath at the home of a former Mauthausen (a death camp) inmate, now a well-to-do jewelry manufacturer. After dinner his host said, “Simon, if you had gone back to building houses, you’d be a millionaire. Why didn’t you?”

“You’re a religious man,” replied Wiesenthal. “You believe in God and life after death. I also believe. When we come to the other world and meet the millions of Jews who died in the camps and they ask us, ‘What have you done?,’ there will be many answers. You will say, ‘I became a jeweler,’ Another will say, ‘I have smuggled coffee and American cigarettes,’ Another will say, ‘I built houses,’ But I will say, ‘I did not forget you’.”

He did not forget the victims of the Nazi genocide.  Neither should the rest of us.

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[1] Feinberg also writes that Professor Hart has his definition of punishment as (in part) “a formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the whole community.” (Henry M. Hart, “The Aims of the Criminal Law,” in Law and Contemporary Problems, 23 (1958))

[2] Lord Denning, in the Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, speaks of punishment as “the emphatic denunciation by the community of a crime.”

[3] Among .. philosophers in recent decades who have made reprobative expressiveness essential to punishment are E.F. Carritt, who wrote in The Theory of Morals (London: Oxford University Press, 1928), 111, that “the essential thing in punishment … is not pain, but the expression of censure, which is necessarily painful.”

[4] Morris R. Cohen, who wrote in Reason and Law (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1950), 50, that “we may look upon punishment as a form of communal expression . . By and large such expression of disapproval is deterrent. But deterrence here is secondary.”

{Joel Feinberg,  Doing and Deserving, (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1970)}

 

 

Does Big Money win Love, Sport Championships, and even the Presidency?

For a number of decades the New Yankees, of major league baseball, have been the richest baseball franchise and, as a result, have fielded superior teams that have won many pennants and World Series (the most of any team by far).  Yet they have not won every year; some years teams with a significantly lower payroll and a more human face have beaten them. (See the great Brooklyn Dodger victory in the 1955 World Series.)  But more frequently than not, deep pockets are the main factor that enables a person or an athletic team to claim victory.   This applies as much in sport competition as it does in politics and love.  Any competitor for the big prize in politics better have a good fund raising team, as well as a good political program (or at least one that appeals to the voters).  Our romantic myths may say that love conquers all, but any man seeking a desirable partner in life better show at least a potential for a decent income if he is to succeed.  A destitute lover usually remains destitute longer than he remains a lover.

So where does this leave us in the summer of 2012?  In national politics, the US Supreme Court has opened to flood gates to unlimited campaign spending by candidates, their supporters and the countless PAC (Political Action Committees) supporting them.  So we can expect the best government that money can buy.  Or can we?  It remains to be seen whether the fabulously wealthy Mitt Romney, with all his deep-pockets corporate and PAC support can win the Presidency over the incumbent, President Barack Obama.

Recently (2012) in the world of Los Angeles/Orange County sports, we have seen three professional franchises, the LA Dodgers, the LA Angels of Anaheim, and the LA Lakers spend millions of dollars to bring in established stars to strengthen their lineups and hopefully win a championship.  Wealthy team owners can shell out big bucks and buy an all-star lineup.  Sometimes this results in a championship; sometimes, it does not.  We shall see how things work out for our two baseball teams and our NBA team.  Maybe they, like Mitt Romney, will show that money wins out, whether in politics or athletic competition. But, I hope not.

What has past history of sports shown us on this question?  Do the best teams that money can buy always win the big prize?  In politics, do wealth and the ability to shell out big money always prove to be the essential factor that leads to victory?

Consider some NBA history involving our Los Angeles Lakers.  In the 1960s the Lakers had two of the best players in the NBA, Elgin Baylor (one of the greatest forwards to play the game) and Jerry West (one of the best guards).  In the summer of 1968 they acquired in a trade the great center, Wilt Chamberlain, giving them a team featuring three of the greatest players in the league.  Surely they would easily win the championship, most people thought.  But they did not win either in ’69, ’70, or ’71.  The big money acquisition of Chamberlain and an all-star lineup did not give them a championship.

A few summers later, in 2003, the Lakers acquired all-stars Karl Malone (one of the best power forwards) and Gary Payton (great defensive guard), who joined the all-star duo of Kobe Bryant and Shaquille O’Neal, who had already won several NBA championships. Who would be able to stop this team of all-stars?   Well, the answer was: the Detroit Pistons, a coherent team of great defenders and one all-star.  The Pistons, with a payroll ridiculously lower than the Lakers, won the NBA championship, beating the Lakers 4 games to 1.

Move a few summers forward, to 2012 and once again the wealthy LA Lakers have spent big money to acquire an all-star team.  They managed to trade for Dwight Howard, the best center in the league, Steve Nash (old, but still one of the best point guards in the NBA), and Antawn Jamison, a great scorer.   These three join all-stars Kobe Bryant and Pau Gasol in a lineup which might win another championship.  We shall see. But NBA history indicates that the team with the most money and the all-star lineup does not always win the big prize.

The Major League baseball season of 2012 also featured two local teams (local for Southern California), the Angels and the Dodgers, who spent millions of dollars to acquire big established stars and build impressive lineups and pitching staffs.  So far, in the American League, the revamped Angels are having a rough time and are in jeopardy of not even making the playoffs.  Interestingly enough, the Oakland Athletics, with a payroll only of fraction of that of the Angels, are leading the Angels in the American West.  The Dodgers only recently spent millions of dollars to acquire all-star players and strengthen their team.  We must wait to see whether their big expenditures pay off.

For some of us there’s something disagreeable with the idea that big money and the all-star teams it can assemble win the day against teams that develop in more traditional ways. One of my favorite NBA season was that of the year ’76-77 when the Portland Trailblazers defeated the Philadelphia 76’ers for the NBA championship.  The Portland team, a working-man’s team led by Bill Walton (center) defeated the powerful Philadelphia 76ers which featured four all-stars led by the great Julius “Dr. J” Erving. I suppose that in NBA competition of 2013 I will be rooting for the San Antonio Spurs and the Oklahoma City Thunder to defeat the all-stars from Los Angeles, and in the 2012 baseball playoffs, I will root for the Oakland A’s and the SF Giants to show up the teams with deep pockets from our Los Angeles area.

In the political sphere, it has been obvious that effective fund raising and the support of wealthy, powerful interests are the sine qua non of any effective political campaign, especially at the State and National levels.  But there are degrees, and some people in politics are not willing to sell out completely to the wealthy and powerful interests that can make or break them.  Unfortunately these types often do not have long careers in public office.  Someone with less integrity and more eagerness to accept the big money often will defeat them, much to the detriment of the political process.  But in a ‘free,’ Capitalist society like ours any complaint against the influence and power of big money sounds rather Quixotic, even ridiculous.

Nevertheless, I will be rooting that the Democrats and Barack Obama can hold their own against the powerful money machine that the GOP and Romney will surely have working against them.  Setting questions of policy and competency aside, one is moved by the pathetic fact that one political party (GOP) has completely sold whatever soul it might have possessed to the biggest bidder.  That alone is enough to motivate me to support the other party.

With regard to romantic love, I hope there are at least a few cases in which the poor, honest boy wins the girl over the deep-pocketed predator, who often prevails because of the great wealth and life of luxury that he offers.  But maybe there are a few perceptive young women out there, as I hope there are enough perceptive voters this November who will not allow themselves to be seduced by the big money of the GOP.

Michael Shermer and a measure of ‘free will’

Juan Bernal

Suppose that I choose a light salad instead of a delicious, but fattening steak at my local restaurant.

Did I exercise some strength of will and make a free choice?

Sam Harris * says no: ““Free will is an illusion. Our wills are simply not of our own making.”

Michael Shermer ** elaborates on this denial of free will: “Every step in the causal chain above is fully determined by forces and conditions not of my choosing, from my evolved taste preferences to my learned social status concerns—causal pathways laid down by my ancestors and parents, culture and society, peer groups and friends, mentors and teachers, and historical contingencies going all the way back to my birth and before.”

Shermer continues: “Neuroscience supports this belief. The late physiologist Benjamin Libet noted in EEG readings of subjects engaged in a task requiring them to press a button when they felt like it that half a second before the decision was consciously made the brain’s motor cortex lit up. Research has extended the time between subcortical brain activation and conscious awareness to a full seven to 10 seconds. A new study found activity in a tiny clump of 256 neurons that enabled scientists to predict with 80 percent accuracy which choice a subject would make before the person himself knew. Very likely, just before I became consciously aware of my menu selections, part of my brain had already made those choices.”

“Thoughts and intentions emerge from background causes of which we are unaware and over which we exert no conscious control,” Harris concludes. “We do not have the freedom we think we have.”

But Shermer argues the contrary view:  “…if we define free will as the power to do otherwise, the choice to veto one impulse over another is free won’t. Free won’t is veto power over innumerable neural impulses tempting us to act in one way, such that our decision to act in another way is a real choice. I could have had the steak—and I have—but by engaging in certain self-control techniques that remind me of other competing impulses, I vetoed one set of selections for another.

“Support for this hypothesis may be found in a 2007 study in the Journal of Neuroscience by neuroscientists Marcel Brass and Patrick Haggard, who employed a task similar to that used by Libet but in which subjects could veto their initial decision to press a button at the last moment. The scientists discovered a specific brain area called the left dorsal frontomedian cortex that becomes activated during such intentional inhibitions of an action: “Our results suggest that the human brain network for intentional action includes a control structure for self-initiated inhibition or withholding of intended actions.” That’s a free won’t.”

———————–

Shermer is surely correct and Harris incorrect on the question of free will.   Shermer makes reference to some interesting neurological evidence for the inhibition-of-impulses process in our brains, something that I had not heard before. But this conforms to what a number of philosophers and psychologists have long argued: namely, that we’re able to make significant choices between contrary alternatives despite that fact that whatever we choose to do can be neurologically explained in terms of a number of brain processes, which we don’t control and of which we’re not even aware.  Yes, there are conditions (disease, injury) which rule out a person’s ability to make significant choices, but these are exceptions to the general rule that most of us can make significant choices (for which we’re held responsible or given credit) between a variety of alternatives.

The ability to make significant choices between various alternatives and act on them is what normally passes for free will, or as Daniel Dennett expressed it in his book, Elbow Room, the only ‘free will’ worth having.

A good part of the problem originates with terminology, in my opinion.  Traditionally philosophers have misinterpreted the terms “free” and “will” in the complex term “free will.”   The tendency has been to take “free” as implying absolute freedom, an act or process not conditioned by any causal factors.  Thus, whenever the scientist can analyze an action as caused by certain neurological or genetic factors (or conditioned by environmental factors) many philosophers mistakenly classify the action as determined, hence, not a free act.  Such reasoning ignores the fact the freedom involved in human action is usually a degree of freedom, often an absence of coercion or overwhelming compulsion; but not at all freedom which rules out all factors, neurological or environmental conditions, which condition the action.

The other tendency is to focus on the term “will” and see free will as some mysterious faculty that humans possess.  Then, when the sciences show that there isn’t any such faculty doubts arise as to the possession of free will.  Free will is not a faculty (faculty of the soul, as some old school philosophers held); it is a capacity or disposition assignable to ordinary persons acting in the world; and it has not been proven to be absent, as many enthusiasts of the neurological sciences mistakenly hold.

Jerry Sandusky, the assistant coach charged with pedophilia (2012), may have been moved by impulses beyond his control and acted out his desire for sex with children.  But many people have had similar compulsions (not necessarily pedophilia, but other undesirable, harmful impulses) pressing on them and manage to resist them.  People are not slaves of their impulses or compulsions, although we all fail to resist them from time to time.  But we are capable of resisting them.  At least to this degree, we do have a measure of ‘free will.’
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* see Harris’s recent book, Free Will (Free Press, 2012)

** See Shermer’s article at   http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-free-will-collides-with-unconscious-impulses

A Naïve Look at Basics of Theism, Atheism, Agnosticism, & Burden of Proof

by Juan Bernal

Statements of fact:

There is a great variety of belief in G-d.  There isn’t any general consensus on the claim that G-d is real.

There is a great variety of non-belief in G-d.  There isn’t any general consensus on the claim that G-d is fiction or non-existent.

In short, these are facts that do not require supporting argument.

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On the question – Does G-d exist?  -  there are three general orientations:

1  Neutral view         -    Who knows?  He might or might not.

2  Affirmative view  -   Yes, G-d exists.

3  Negative view      -   No, likely He does not exist.

1 – Neutral View    Generally, this is the attitude that a deity may or may not exist; often this is associates with an attitude of not caring or worrying about it one way or another.

(It can be a mere psychological state without a theory of reality.)

This can be the position that does not imply any theory of reality, i.e., a metaphysics.

Sometimes this is the agnostic view:  we simply don’t know whether a deity exists and don’t have any rational grounds for the belief that G-d exists.

Example:  Jack omits belief in G-d, i.e., Jack stays neutral and simply does not think about G-d.  Jack does not commit to a theory of reality, i.e., a metaphysics.

Non-Neutral Positions

But if you opt to take a position on the issue of a deity, then there are two alternatives.

2 – An Affirmative View  -   One affirms that G-d exists.   This general view comes in several versions:  for example,

Cases in which .  . .

a)      …Enrique affirms that G-d is objectively real (i.e., there really is a G-d).  He has the burden of making a positive case (argument) for G-d’s existence.

b)  ..Jill believes in G-d.  Jill proceeds as if there was a G-d (she has faith in or personal reason for believing in G-d.)

c)…Teresa claims that G-d’s reality is a unique reality, not subject to proof or disproof. G-d is a reality of faith, a mystical reality.

3 – A Negative View  -   One doubts or denies that G-d exists. This view has several versions, and in some cases is compatible with agnosticism:    For example, cases in which . .

d)…Thomas asserts that there is no G-d, i.e., there is no such objective reality.  He has the burden of making a case for his conclusion: There is no G-d.

e) …Jeronimo does not belief in G-d, i.e., Jeronimo proceeds as if there were no G-d (He may think about the possibility of G-d, but does not believe in a G-d.)

f)…Lorenzo holds that the proposition that G-d exists does not have a clear, unequivocal meaning, and that the whole business of trying to prove or disprove G-d’s existence is a questionable enterprise.

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Sometimes people take on the philosophical burden of making a good case for G-d’s reality.

Sometimes others take on the philosophical burden of making a good case for G-d’s nonexistence.

Some versions of positions 2 and 3 call for argument, i.e., have a philosophical “burden of proof”

With Enrique (a) and Thomas (d) there definitely is a “burden of proof.”  To make good on their respective views, each would have to present arguments or evidence to support his view.

In some cases, Jeronimo’s view (e) may not require that he argue against the reality of a deity, although he might occasionally take up the cause against deity.  He could also be an agnostic, emphasizing that nobody knows that G-d exists.  Likewise, Jill’s faith (b) does not require that she try to make a good, rational case for the existence of G-d, although she might take up the cause of arguing for G-d’s existence.

In short, certain varieties of belief or non-belief in deity may have a philosophical  “burden of proof.”

Others do not.

For both Lorenzo (f) and Teresa (c) there is no rational test for G-d’s existence, since they explicitly rule out the relevance of argument for or against the reality ‘G-d’.

=================================

When we attempt to show either that G-d exists or the contrary, that G-d does not exist we might think of ‘proving’ our proposition in terms of one of these analogies.

  • Proof in logic or mathematics:   Logically prove your conclusion
  • A Hypothesis in science:   Pose your hypothesis and attempt to confirm it
  •  Police Detective work: Seek evidence for concluding that E did or did not happen.
  •  Court of law:  Work out a good case, by legal argument, for a legal client
  •  Ordinary Experience:  I say that X is true and try to show reasons why others should concur.

Question: When you try to show that G-d exists or the contrary, that G-d does not exist, which type of ‘proof’ do you have in mind?

A Strange and Confused View of New Atheism

By Juan Bernal

An acquaintance, call him Bradley, argued along these lines:

I have found that many atheists today subscribe to a new definition of atheism and have rejected the historical and classical definition.  This newer definition goes something like this,

“Atheism simply means that a person lacks a belief in any god.”

This new definition actually weakens the atheist’s position, making it virtually impossible for the atheist to engage in any philosophical discussion regarding reality from his atheistic position.

 

Bradley then stated that according to the new definition of atheism,  “atheism” simply means that a person lacks a belief in gods; atheism has no theory of reality.   Then he stated that   given this new definition, the “atheist” is making no statements about reality, but a statement about his subjective beliefs; it is a statement about his present psychological make-up. This is a passive statement. The person holding to the new definition of atheism is not discussing the nature of reality, but merely sharing his subjective thoughts, his lack of a belief in any god.

.  .  .  .

He summarizes this case concerning the new definition of atheism:

  • It does not negate the primary claim of theism concerning reality.
  • It does not make any claims about reality.
  • It does share with us part of the person’s psychological make-up and that is all.

The new definition of atheism has taken a once robust opponent of theism and drained it of its vigor. It has ripped it from the arena of ideas and placed firmly on the psychologists couch.

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Critique: 

 

The core of Bradley’s critique of atheism (a version of ‘atheism’) is contained in the following:

“Atheism simply means that a person lacks a belief in gods; atheism has no theory of reality.”

.. This is because, given this new definition, the “atheist” is making no statements about reality, but a statement about his subjective beliefs; it is a statement about his present psychological make-up. This is a passive statement. The person holding to the new definition of atheism is not discussing the nature of reality, but merely sharing his subjective thoughts, his lack of a belief in any god

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If we agree that the proposition that ‘atheism has no theory of reality’ follows from the stated definition that ‘atheism simply means that one lacks belief in God,’ then we must accept Bradley’s characterization of the definition as restricting itself to a statement of the psychological state of the atheist, and nothing else.

I  contend that the statement of one’s lack of belief in a God (a supernatural being) does not have to be understood as merely stating what one’s psychological state is, although it may do that in addition to doing more.

I don’t see why we should deny that one way of stating my view of reality is merely to say “I lack belief in God or any god.” I’m not just telling you what my psychological state is or giving you my preference in psychological states. I am telling you that, insofar as I have a theory of reality, my idea of reality omits all putative supernatural beings. As far as I can tell there are no such beings found in the world that I occupy (nor do I find any viable grounds for claiming some kind of supernatural or transcendent contact with that world).

There is no convincing reason for asserting (as Bradley does) that the statement “my view of things omits belief in God” does not imply a basic view of reality. The statement is a qualified statement of what the person takes as reality, without his making the full-blown metaphysical declaration that the non-existence of God can be proven. Both the theistic declaration and the qualified a-theistic statement are statements about reality; one is simply more modest than the other. The statements that God exists and the contrary one that God does not exist (strong a-theism) are less modest. But we surely do not have to understand my statement of omission as one that merely describes a subjective psychological state, as if I were merely telling you that I feel an itch in my middle, upper back.

———————————–

Suppose we’re discussing rumors of teenage predators roaming our neighborhood at night and I tell you that I don’t believe there are any such intruders at all, that it is just a rumor made up by nervous people. I have said that my thinking omits such a belief. But here I have surely told you what my view (‘theory’) of the night time, neighborhood situation is: there aren’t any such predators. I have not simply described my subjective state of mind to you.

Now suppose that, in reference to the same rumor, I said that I was not at all worried about that possibility (that teenage predators are out there at night). Here we could say that what I have done is merely describe my subjective state to you, namely, that I don’t experience any worry about such things. My tranquil state of mind (no worries at all) is consistent both with the actual presence of the predators or their absence. In other words, my tranquil state of mind (and my report of that state of mind) does not affirm anything about the actual situation that exists in our neighborhood at night. We could say, my lack of worry does not affirm any ‘theory’ of the neighborhood situation at night.
———-

The contrast between these two situations (I “don’t know X” and I “don’t worry about X”) illustrates the confusionn behind Bradley’s thesis with respect to his version of the new definition of “atheism.” The statement that I don’t believe in God (or that such belief is omitted from my view of things) surely affirms a ”theory’ of reality, one that does not include a deity. However, Bradley has confused “I don”t know X” with “I don’t worry about X.” Had I said that I don’t worry about a putative God, I would just describe my mental state, and such mental state is consistent both with the existence and the non-existence of a deity. The ‘don’t worry’ statement can be understood as not affirming a ‘metaphysics’; but the “don’t believe” statement does. It seems that these kinds of contrasting statements have been overlooked by Bradley in his argument concerning the “new atheism.”

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Suppose that I admit, as many non-believers do, that I cannot be completely certain that God does not exist because I cannot prove that God’s existence is logically impossible. It surely does not follow that I admit that God’s existence is probable (has a reasonably high probability). In other words, we can consistently admit that we cannot logically disprove God’s existence while arguing on the basis of evidence available that mostly likely there is no God. The logical possibility of God is consistent with a metaphysics or view of reality which omits God or any deity. As far as I can determine, this is the view of many so-called “new atheists” (such as Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, Victor Stenger,  Daniel Dennett and others).

Contrary to what Bradley argues, the new atheists and those who subscribe to a philosophy of naturalism do not define atheism so that God is a real possibility, even highly probable. Such non-theists, which include many humanists, hold that the God of Christian theism and theology is highly improbable. Even saying this much allows that the concept is a coherent, clear concept as applied to a putative real being who has some interaction with human history and human society. Some non-believers, such as myself, will even argue contra that premise; but that is a subject for another discussion.

Presently, I will just emphasize that Bradley’s tactic (in line with Medieval theology) of defining God as either a necessary being or an impossible being (after ruling out the alternative of contingency); and then inferring that, in as much as the atheist does not rule out the possibility of God, he must admit to the necessity of God — simply will not work. It does not show any real implications of the new atheists’ position; it merely shows what follows logically from the adoption of a specific concept of deity, one that rules out contingency and any arguments contra God’s existence based on our contingent human conditons. This is a mere game-playing with logic, artificial definitions and concepts, a tactic best left in the Middle Ages.

Re. Bradley’s “new” definition of atheism: It is strange to hold that a person who considers himself an atheist would assert an ‘atheism’ that turns out to be only a report of his subjective, mental state and that he would admit that an existent deity is a real possibility. Besides being a rather bizarre view of atheism, one is left really puzzled as to which atheists take such a view. Richard Dawkins certainly does not. After all, Dawkins takes the view that God is a delusion.

———————–

Generally, statement of belief makes reference to the object of belief, which is not a mere psychological state.  Although belief often involves some state of mind, the object of most of our beliefs is something other than our psychological state of mind.  For example, when I tell you that I don’t believe that our water will last another hour, I may say something about my state of mind (worry); but I surely say something about an objective state of affairs; namely, our water supply is low and will not last another hour.

More Mad Men Ideas, or is it philosophy?

By Juan Bernal

Either the following show

Momentary Madness or surprising philosophical Confusion.

1 – Belief – When anyone states that he believes X he is just describing his subjective state of mind and not saying anything about X. Hence, when Joe states that he does not believe in God (that he omits such belief), he only describes his subject state but says nothing about his view of reality.

2 – Experiences  -  In each and every perceptual experience, we only have our perceptions. Any affirmation about things behind those perceptions is just a questionable inference.

3 – Agency –   When we ascribe human agency (say that a person does something) we presuppose that the agent is an inner self (soul, ego, Cartesian subject, ghost-in-the-machine, etc.).  Hence, when science denies the reality of this inner self, we must deny human agency.

4 – Control –  Admitting that humans are causally determined in all their actions implies the consequence that they are never in control of their actions.

5 – All or Nothing  –  Either we are in full control or we have no control whatsoever.  Either we are fully autonomous or we have no autonomy at all.  Either we enjoy absolute freedom or we have no freedom at all.

6 – Scientific Theory —  Theories in science differ from confabulation only in matter of degree; hence, scientific theories ultimately are just a form of confabulation.

7 – Knowledge & Truth  –   In so far as naturalism asserts that evolution is unguided evolution, naturalism implies that human sense faculties are unreliable.  The evolutionary fact that our sense faculties are adaptations that enable us to survive and negotiate our environment says nothing about the capability of those faculties to apprehend truth.  Our sense faculties do not often result in true beliefs.

8 – Probability & God  —   Some very intelligent people have advanced arguments that show high probability calculations for God’s existence.  Hence, the skeptic has the burden of showing what is wrong with those arguments,  otherwise his skepticism cannot be rational skepticism.

Attempts to Remedy:

R – 1   Belief.  Although belief often involves some state of mind, the object of most of our beliefs is something other than our psychological state of mind.  For example, when I tell you that I don’t believe that our water will last another hour, I may say something about my state of mind (worry); but I surely say something about an objective state of affairs; namely, our water supply is low and will not last another hour.

R – 2   Perceptual Experience -  It is only in terms of a specific model of perceptual experience that one would affirm that we only have our perceptions. But that model of perceptual experience in which the subject only receives signals from outside is just the result of an analysis of the brain processes that underlie perception.  This analysis does not demonstrate that we only see our seeing or hear our hearing, or touch our touching and so on.   Although sometimes we might say correctly that have visions only subjective in nature or hear phantom sounds (in our head), the ordinary situation is one in which we see things out in the world (trees, dogs, other persons) and hear sounds coming from sources out there in the world (the ocean waves, music by an orchestra, words spoken by our fellows).  It is false that we “have only our perceptions.”

R – 3  Agency – Science and critical philosophy have long shown that there is no ghost in the machine, i.e., no internal self, soul, ego, or Cartesian subject.  But it surely does not follow that the person is not an agent capable of doing many things.  As I can ride a bike or hike five miles, I can also write a poem or analyze an argument.  I can do all these things and affirm that I am the person who does these things without assuming that a small agent exists inside my head who is is the real agent who does the doing.  The inference from denial of the ghost in the machine to denial of agency is simply a gross conceptual confusion.

R – 4   Control  -  Human beings, like all entities existing in a natural and social environment, have a variety of causal conditions that limit what they can and cannot do. Much of what we are and do is causally conditioned.  But this fact does not imply that we have no control over what we can do.  We most often do control a good part of what we do, within the context of many conditions that we don’t control.  It was only a remnant of the old doctrine of a soul not affected by material causation that led some people to the false conclusion that lack of control results from being subjected to a variety of causal conditions.

R – 5   All or Nothing Dichotomies:   They’re all false.  Surely the freedom we enjoy is subject to degrees of freedom, as is the control that we exert on our actions.  That we have limited freedom and limited control does not imply that we lack all control and have no freedom at all.  Personal autonomy does not imply absolute autonomy; it implies only that we have a measure of autonomy, but a measure sufficient for assigning responsibility and credit for our actions.  Nobody ever demonstrated that this required absolute autonomy.

R – 6   Scientific Theory:   Confabulation is a made-up story to cover up something we don’t know or cannot recall.  Scientific theory may be a hypothesis that directs initial investigation or an established theory that unifies evidence and information that our investigation discovers.  In neither case do we have any reason for saying that responsible, informed theorizing is just a form of confabulation.

R – 7   Naturalism undermines knowledge:   The argument showing that naturalism is not consistent with reliable human sense faculties is unsound.  It proceeds on the questionable assumption that adaptations resulting from natural evolution do not result in true beliefs or hardly ever do so.  No argument or reasonable grounds are ever given for this assumption.  It is a false assumption.

R-8    Probability & God:   A number of contemporary philosophers resort to some version Bayes’ Theorem to develop probability arguments regarding traditional religious and historical issues.   The problem is that such probability arguments can be developed by both those who attempt to prove God’s existence and those who work to show the contrary: namely, disprove God’s existence.  Odds are that the skeptical arguments do as much, likely more, than the positive ones.  The fact that very intelligent people are at work is a completely irrelevant fact.  The proof is in the pudding; and the pudding favors those who argue on the basis of real, not imagined, probabilities.

Some Remarks on the “GOD” Belief

by Juan Bernal (a half-hearted a-theist)

 From a perspective of morality, the important question is not ‘Do you believe in God?’  Rather the questions to ask are: ‘How do you conduct your life?’  ‘How do you treat other people?’  ‘What values do you try to express and put into action?’

Among believers (in a god) you find both morally conscientious people and immoral or amoral people; likewise among non-believers. A person’s moral character seems to come before his particular religious perspective. (There’s a sense in which belief in God is transparent.)

By including the commandment requiring belief in the one God, the Ten Commandments include more than we need as a set of moral/ethical imperatives.  For in many cases (maybe most cases), a person’s belief or lack of belief in a deity is separate from his moral behavior.  Only persons with immature ethical mentality behave in a morally good way only because “God” demands it and will punish them if they do what’s wrong (in a moral sense of “wrong”).

With regard to personal interaction, likely there is not much difference between persons who believe in a god and non-theists (atheists, agnostics, humanists). They all share the same world; most interact peacefully and count as morally decent people. They can all be good citizens (of earth, of our nation, of our community) and can all contribute positively to common, social goals.

Each in his/her way can work to express his vision of moral good, truth, and beauty.  They can all be godly people.

From a historical and philosophical perspective. belief in or lack of belief in a god seems irrelevant to the issue of good and evil in the world. Many good and excellent people have believed in a god. However, many good and excellent people have not believed in any god. The same can be said for people who have been predators, exploiters, oppressors and murderers.

Of course, many people in our society claim a consciousness, even awareness, of a god. They might say “There is some(one) or some(thing) that I talk to and pray to in times of need. This is what I mean by “God.”  Such persons may go on to add that “the reality of God is one that is psychologically undeniable; it is a reality that comprises the background of all my thoughts and actions; it is the basis for any significance I find in my existence.”

[Note: in many cases this perspective is a personal, private matter that may have little or nothing in common with the theological doctrines of established religions.]

Another thought is that ‘God’ or any benevolent power that may be found in the universe is big enough to accept all human views on question of a ‘god’ or ‘gods’:  believers and non-believers – theists, atheists, agnostics, humanists.

The theism in question could be very personal: “my God understands, even has empathy for agnostics and secular humanists. This deity has such an intellect and such a moral character that he/she would never condemn heresy or atheism, and certainly would never dream up anything as morally primitive as a hell of eternal torment (for nonbelievers).”

[Note: That G is an undeniable ‘reality’ for a subset of human beings by itself is not evidence for the objective reality of G.  For example, my claim that Yeshu is an undeniable reality in my existence says more about my mind (my values, assumptions, ideas, attitudes) than it says about objective reality. It tells you much about me, but cannot reasonably be seen as evidence for the actual existence of Yeshu. It says much about how I see the world  or what I believe is the nature of reality, and establishes nothing about the nature of the world that exists independently of the way I see it. Here we’re referring to values and a person’s perspective on the world.]

Consciousness of God or belief in God is a matter of spiritual orientation, but it is not an awareness of objective truth. It is a personal, moral and spiritual orientation. It should have nothing to do with a reach for power, greed, exclusivity, claims to special knowledge or privileged access.  It is a way of looking at certain aspects of existence.

Historically, much misery and suffering could have been avoided if people had recognized that the nobler forms of religion deal with values and spirituality, not with doctrines or dogma about objective reality, and not with a supernatural being who includes certain groups and excludes, even condemns, other groups.

[Belief in a god should not be a crutch (an excuse for lack of initiative or effort on our part), nor a bully club (an excuse for excluding and oppressing others who do not share the belief), nor a skyhook (an ad hoc or “deus ex machinus” type explanation of existence).]

Sometimes belief in a god takes on the tone of mystery:  Belief in a god is sometimes an acknowledgment that there is much that is beyond the scope of our intellect, much mystery,  wonder and terror. There are powers, forces, realities, etc. that are vast and incredibly greater than we are. There is something greater than humans and the world of disclosed by human faculties. This is not necessarily a claim about supernatural reality, but could simply be a statement of awe and wonder in the face of the power and vastness of the universe.  Maybe others such as Plato (his talk of the “Good”), or the Buddha (his search for Nirvana), or Spinoza (his intellectual love of God), or the mystics (who find an inexpressible, profound union with …..) are getting at something akin to this godliness.  Some may find it in the Great Spirit of Native Americans or the nameless, hidden God of reform Judaism.

Lysenko: Pathological Science

Charles Rulon

Emeritus, Life Sciences, Long Beach City College

Introduction

In the former U.S.S.R. the story of Soviet gen­et­ics from 1937 to 1964 was one of the most tragic ex­am­­ples, with disastrous results, of a pseudo-scientific belief rising to absolute dog­ma.  During this time a plant physiologist and char­latan named Trofim D. Lysenko rose to power, eventually achieving abso­lute control over all genetic and agricultural re­search.  Lysenko not only de­stroyed the lives of thousands of scientists and sti­fled the devel­opment of biology in the U.S.S.R. for decades; he also had a dev­a­statingly destructive influence on Rus­sia’s entire economy.[i]

Lysenkoism

Stalin came into power as a suc­ces­sor to Lenin in 1929.  At same time Russia was experi­encing a crisis in agri­cultural production; severe losses in wheat were occurring.  Stalin was power crazy, cruel, treach­­erous and intolerant of brilliant individ­ualists.  He institutionalized terror and during his reign (1929-1953) was respon­sible for the death of millions.

In 1931 Stalin demanded solu­tions to the seri­ous agricultural problems in the U.S.S.R.  Vavi­lov, president of the Soviet Acad­emy of Scien­ces and a world fam­ous ge­neticist, re­sponded that at least a decade of basic research would first be required.  When Stalin be­came outraged that Russian sci­ence could not quickly pro­vide the agri­cultural miracles he demanded, the green light flashed for Lysenko.  Lysenko claimed that he could solve Rus­sia’s agricultural pro­blems in under three years.  He convinced government of­ficials that their previous failures to produce rapid improve­ment in the ge­netic traits of agricultural plants was the fault of the bankrupt ideology of “bour­geois” sci­ence that had become corrupted by the false genetics of the West.  Lysenko insisted, in­stead, (with badly con­trol­led experi­ments and falsi­fied data) that those agricultural plants which had been made more productive through ad­justing the levels of nutri­­ents, water, light and so on could ge­neti­cally pass on this increased productivity to their offspring.

This claim, known in science as the “inheritance of acquired characteristics” already had been thoroughly scientific­ally disproved.  For example, although a tree can be forced through strenuous trim­ming to remain small for many years, the result­ing bonsai tree has not changed gen­eti­cally. Trees produced from its seeds will grow to nor­mal size if left un­pruned.  As another example, for thousands of years the feet of young Chinese girls were tightly bound for the rest of their lives (a very painful practice which severely stunted the growth of women’s feet).  Yet when the practice was finally discon­tinued the foot size of Chi­­nese women had not changed at all; the ac­quired trait of small feet had not been inher­ited.  And then there are the thousands of years of male circum­ci­sion, yet penile foreskins still exist.

Yet, Lysenko’s claim that favorable plant characteristics as a result of the plants’ interac­tion with its environ­ment could be passed on genetically (a belief that came to be known as Lysenko­ism) was politi­cally quite attrac­tive to Stalin, not only because it promised quick agricultural improve­­ment, but also be­cause it implied that loyalty, courage and politi­cal dedica­tion to the Communist Party might also be genetically passed on.

The rise of power-driven pathological science

Scien­tific truth is born from the sci­en­tific method.  Strong differences of opinion are both common and healthy in science.  But in the U.S.S.R. of the 1930s, with its spy hunts and fever­ish searches for “enemies of the people,” unfounded poli­tical accusations became common­place.  Lysenko came to realize that making poli­t­i­cal accu­sations against his scien­ti­fic oppon­ents was a very effective way of eliminating them.  So in the 1930s those geneticists and other biol­o­gists who disagreed with Lysenko were simply declared to be anti-Marxist saboteurs and enemies of the State who should be unmasked, driven from the temple of Soviet science and annihila­ted.  Slandering and defam­ing of others helped to con­ceal Lysenko’s pseu­do-science.  Even the scientifically well-established gene theory of heredity was denounced because it was seen as “bourgeois, reac­tion­ary, meta­physical and barren.”  Stalin, who saw him­self as a scientific genius, took Lysenko’s side and the ma­jor­ity of Soviet gen­eti­cists “disappeared”.

Lysenko’s power continued to grow, along with his fabrication of data.  By appealing to the scientifically ignorant power structure Lysenko slowly rose from be­ing an unknown in the early l930s to a posi­tion of such influ­ence by l940 that he was able to have Vav­ilov, the president of the Soviet Aca­demy of Sciences, arrested as a spy, convicted of agri­cultural sab­o­tage and im­pris­oned in 1940, where he died a few years later.  Vavilov’s scien­tific colla­bor­ators and friends were also ar­rested and many later perished in prison.

However, by 1948 Lysenko knew he was in trouble.  Soviet genetics and agricultural science was now lag­ging far behind that in the United States.  He realized that only the total sup­pression of all oppo­si­tion by Stalin, himself, could keep him in power.  So using skills honed over the previous decade, Lysenko was able to convince Stalin that all the remaining opposi­tion had to go.  Soon, hundreds of the best and most qualified Soviet biological scientists were dis­missed or demoted on the basis of fab­ri­cated accusa­tions of sabo­tage, or of supporting anti-Marxism.

With all opposition routed, Lysenko was pro­moted to president of the Lenin Academy of Agri­cultural Sci­ences.  With Stalin’s support he bec­ame virtually a dic­tator of genetics of the U.S.S.R., the undisputed auth­ority with full con­trol over agricul­ture and most of biol­ogy.  The Lysenkoites immediately at­tempted to des­­troy all remaining traces of oppo­sition.  Clas­si­cal genetics, one of the most impor­tant branches of the biological sciences, was declared a state men­ace.  Textbooks were destroyed or rewritten; names and pictures were black­­ened out; all Western gen­etics literature was re­moved from the libraries.  Sci­ence cour­ses from secondary schools to medical colleges were re­quired to teach Lysenkoism.  The whole body of ge­netic knowledge that had been accumu­lated in thou­sands of experi­ments around the world in the course of half a century was dis­carded by simply stating that it came from rot­ting capi­talist countries.

Lysenko’s rule became supreme.  His portraits were hung in all scientific institutions; busts of him were sold in art stores; cities erected monu­ments to him; folk songs were even written about him.  For the next several years (1948-1953) he was in to­tal control.  The full power of the Stalinist police state was employ­ed to silence all oppo­si­tion.  When Stalin died in 1953, he was replaced by Khrush­chev, also a sup­porter of Ly­senko.

Final­ly, follow­ing several serious agricultural failures and a growing awareness that Khrushchev’s reck­less eco­nomic poli­cies had proved dis­astrous to the U.S.S.R., Khrush­chev was removed from power in 1964.  Shortly afterward Lysenko was fi­nally exposed and publicly dis­graced.  A degree of sanity had finally returned to Russian genetics.  But by now its agriculture was in a shambles.

Forces at Work

What were the forces operating that so dramat­ic­ally shifted government support away from the widely ac­cepted genetic and biological sciences of the time to the pseudo-science of Lysenko?

a. Destructive agricultural po­­li­cies:   For many years prior to Lysenko, Soviet agricultural policies had been based more on achieving max­imum agri­cultural output at minimum financial cost, re­gard­less of the envi­ronmental costs (soil erosion, salt­ing up of the land).  Thus the stage was set for agri­cultural disasters.

b. Control of media:  Soviet political lead­er­­­ship determined which scientific trends would be sup­por­ted by the press and which would be sup­pressed.  When Lysenko received the endorse­ment of Stalin the mass media became his pup­pet.  Up to 1964 the central press did not allow any serious articles criti­cizing Lysenko­ism, al­though many such manuscripts were submitted.  Instead, hun­dreds of articles in support of Lysen­ko and criti­cizing classical biology were pub­lished.

c. Isolationism:  An important factor in the pro­longed domination of Lysenkoism was the iso­lation of the U.S.S.R. from world science.  By 1937 the attempt by any Soviet scientist for scien­tific inter­change with foreign colleagues was looked on as a political crime and a cause for ar­rest.  Peer review was dis­couraged as a plot by the power­ful to enslave the peasant class.  Aca­demic in­quiry was seen as an insult to the great Soviet people.  This iso­lation of Soviet scientific hy­po­theses from exter­nal crit­icism con­tributed much to the flou­rish­ing of many false beliefs which rose to become dogmas.

d. Strong centralization:  Rigid cen­traliza­tion in the U.S.S.R. permit­ted a single admin­istra­tive structure to impose a man­datory curriculum in biology for all insti­tu­tions of higher learning.  Since all funds supporting scientific research came from one central source, disa­gree­ing with this source could mean the end of one’s career.  Thus, the capturing of key adminis­trative posts by the Lysenkoites se­cured for them full control over vir­tu­ally all biological and agricul­tural science, plus all educational facilities.

Lysenkoism:  Parallels to­day

Over the last few decades, many parallels have appeared between the anti-global warming activists and the Lysenkoites in the for­mer U.S.S.R.  These anti-science activists have all rejected considerable scien­tific know­ledge painstakingly gathered and, instead, have mis­repre­sented and dis­tor­ted the evidence.  They have bypassed peer review scien­ce jour­nals and gone directly to unin­­formed and/or ideologically biased public, politi­cians, legis­la­tors, government officials and other leaders who then decide what is “good science” and what isn’t.  In 2004 the Bush White House received failing marks in science from 62 leading scientists for suppressing EPA studies and for misrepresenting the findings of the National Academy of Sciences and other experts on climate change.[ii]

Also, although our media is not directly govern­ment controlled as it was in the U.S.S.R., large conservative corporations are heavily invested in ownership.  Plus, repor­ters are mostly scientific­ally illiterate and committed to presenting both sides equally.  So silly supersti­tion and serious sci­ence are often given the same weight.  There are also dead­lines to make; no time to do research.  And many repor­ters don’t seem to care about the objec­t­ive truth of the matter.  “A story’s a story.”  Pleasing readers and making money is more important than exercising scien­tific rigor.

False doctrines rising to prominence

As with Lysenkoism, any number of scientific disproved claims have risen to prominence in the U.S.  For example, over 40% of Americans still reject the fact of our biological evolution in favor of Genesis creation myths.  Another widely-held myth is that having a homo­­sex­ual orientation (being erotically and/or romantically drawn to the same sex) is a free choice gays make—that they can become “straight” if they really want­ed to.  Still another wide-spread, but scientifically nonsensical belief, is that fertilized eggs and tiny, mind­less, senseless, human embryos in Mississippi are actually Mississippians and thus should have the same right to life as you or I.  Still other widely held beliefs that con­tain con­sid­­erable scientific nonsense involve homeopa­thy, acupunc­ture, astrol­ogy, grapho­logy, natur­o­pa­thy, therapeutic touch and subliminal percep­tion.  Nor have visitations from outer space, or anything para­normal, or anything su­pernatural ever been scientific­ally docu­mented.  Yet, true believers abound, along with their testimonials, govern­ment conspir­acy theories and/or messages from their god(s).

Concluding thoughts

The memory of Lysenko lingers on as a remark­able and tragic epi­sode in the history of modern science and as a warn­ing of what could happen when science is perverted for political, reli­gious and other ideological ends.  Freedom of critical expres­­sion is a fra­gile flower that may be easily crushed by charla­tans and demagogues unafraid of using the power of the state for their own reli­gious, greedy, or political ends

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[i]Much information on Lysenko in this article came from the book, The Rise and Fall of T.D. Lysenko, by Zhores A. Medvedev, 1969, Colum­bia Univer­sity Press.  Medvedev was in charge of the labora­tory at the Institute of Medical Radiology in Russia and published nearly one hundred papers, mostly on the molecular aspects of development and aging.  His manu­script on Lysenko was translated into English by Michael Lerner, Profes­sor of Genetics at the University of California, Berkeley.  Other references used included: The Lysenko Affair  (1970) by D. Joravsky: Harvard University Press; Proletarian Science? The Case of Lysenko (1978), by D. Lecourt: Schocken;  Lysenko and the Tragedy of Soviet Science(1994), by V. Soyfer: Rutgers University Press.

[ii]“Restoring Scientific Integrity in Policy Making,” <www.ucsusa.org>

Does the ‘Special Status’ of the Christian God not make him immune to scientific critique?

By Juan Bernal

Some people defend theism by arguing that theism represents a reasonable philosophy because it is consistent with the prevailing scientific picture of reality.  Such defenders of theism claim that the sciences (i.e., the relevant sciences) have not proven beyond all doubt that a belief in God is false.  Sometimes they add that despite all our accrued scientific knowledge of the physical and biological world, God, as conceived by Western theology and areas of Western theistic philosophy, could exist somehow and somewhere behind the scenes, beyond the scope of the sciences and critical, rational inquiry.  In short, according to the defenders, belief in God has not been refuted by any of the sciences.

Prima facie, this appears to be a very weak position, arguing that something is reasonable just because it could (possibly) be true:

That p could be the case despite the fact that the body of evidence available fails to support p is a very weak basis for belief in p.   Most people, in their rational moments, would agree that for just about any value of p, ‘that p could be true’ is a very weak (even non-existent) basis for asserting the truth of p.   The same can be said regarding the fact that not-p has not been logically demonstrated.  None of these support the assertion that p is true,   To take the contrary position is to open the gate to the ‘truth’ of a large set of myth, fiction, fantasies and such.  After all, the sciences do not concentrate on refuting every creature of human myth and fantasy, but very few take seriously the hypothesis that such creatures of myth and fantasy are real.

However, there are some philosophers who exempt this rational skepticism when the value of p is a particular, venerated belief in God.  Among these philosophers and students of philosophy we find such people as the Christian philosopher, Alvin Plantinga and my e-mail correspondent, Pablo. For these people, the concept of God developed by Western theologians and theistic philosophers is special, categorically different from other mythical and fictional entities that the sciences don’t bother to refute.

This philosophy comes out in Plantinga’s insistence that belief in God is consistent with science and with evolutionary science in particular.  According to him, the sciences and even Darwinian’s theory of evolution do not deny the possibility that God may have acted behind the scenes in guiding evolution at key points.  He admits that scientists do not assume this to be true, but points out that they don’t explicitly deny it.  God could have guided evolution.  According to him, the claim by “naturalists” that evolution is a blind, unguided process is a philosophical claim, not one having a scientific warrant.  (I believe that Pablo also holds to this view.)

Opponents like Daniel Dennett (with his Superman character) and my fellow skeptic,  Chuckles (who once satirically promoted the mythical Greek god, Poseidon, as a competitor to the Judeo-Christian version of “God”), counter these theistic tactics by turning the table and making similar claims for their candidates for theistic supremacy, Superman and Poseidon. The theists shut them down by insisting that the cases are very different because the concept of God favored by the theists is a very special concept, not at all one that compares with ideas and images of mythical, fictional entities such as Superman and Poseidon.

Why do Plantinga, Pablo, and other defenders of theism allege that the cases are so different?  The reasons given take various forms.  Plantinga at one point mentions that, contrary to Dennett’s superman character, God is a necessary being.  He also stresses that, whereas God could have guided evolution, Dennett’s Superman character could not.   Pablo on occasion has argued that the concept of God has been developed and refined to a fine point — which is internally consistent and affirmed by millions of theists — something which we cannot claim for any of our alternative candidates, whether Dennett’s Superman or Chuckle’s Poseidon.

So how effective are these claims?  For the skeptic, it is not at all obvious that the theistic belief in and concept of God establishes any kind of priority.  With respect to the theological notion of “necessary Being,” it is a longstanding philosophical counter-argument that you cannot establish the reality of X merely by declaring X to be a necessary being. It is not even clear that the concept of necessity (as in mathematical or logical necessity) even applies to real existence. Plantinga’s statement that his God is a necessary being, whereas alternative candidates for godhood and designer of evolution are not, looks to be nothing more than special pleading.

When we turn to the argument that Western theology and theistic philosophy somehow establish a priority for a specific concept of God, we find that the argument fails on several key points:  there is no single concept of God which is accepted by all major schools of theology and all theistic philosophers who write on the subject.  Even when we limit ourselves to Western theism, we find a variety of God concepts held by different theologians, philosophers, and churchmen.   Selecting one of these as the official version, as Pablo does, and arguing that this concept of God should be given favorable status will not do as an effective argument that such a God has a better claim to reality than any alternative candidate. Arguing that p is likely true just because honorable theologians have struggled for centuries to refine the concept and show that p is true is not an effective argument that the proposition p has a better chance of being true than any competing propositions, r,s,t,…

Given that neither the great Alvin Plantinga nor the honorable Pablo have made a good case for their claim that the god concept familiar to Western theologians and theistic philosophers is special and has ontological priority, neither one has a basis for denying that the same could-be-true tactic can also apply to alternative candidates for godhood that we might care to promote.   Just as the sciences have not proven that the Christian God does not exist, they have not proven that Superman or Poseidon do not exist.   If we allow the reasonableness of belief in God on the basis of his could-exist status, we must allow the same type of ‘reasonableness’ to belief in Superman or in Poseidon.

Hence, the Plantinga’s claim that his God could be real despite the naturalists view that theism gets no support whatsoever from the sciences completely fails as a way of showing the special status and reasonableness of his Christian theism.

Thinking further on this little exercise, we might conclude that in either case (Plantinga’s Christian God and Superman/Poseidon) we’re just playing around with mythical, fictional notions.  That’s all that is happening, folks!  And such musings on myths and fantasies have nothing to do with a scientifically-based, well-reasoned view of reality.